Research On The Impact Of Executive Compensation Structure On Corporate Value From The Perspective Of Property Rights

China's economic environment is becoming more and more complex,and the market competition is becoming increasingly fierce.As the most important core resource of listed companies,senior managers are responsible for formulating corporate strategy and ensuring the steady growth of corporate value.Their actions,words and deeds have attracted much attention.They always send the signal of the company's development to the public.As a way to motivate senior managers,compensation has a certain relationship with the company's value.China's economic system is mainly a mixed economic system dominated by state-owned enterprises and supported by non-state-owned enterprises.Therefore,it is necessary to take into account the influence of institutional forces on the formation of executive compensation structure.When studying the relationship between executive compensation structure and corporate value of listed companies,we should consider the influence of property rights.Firstly,based on the three theories of "principal-agent problem" in modern corporate governance system,this paper clarifies the purpose and significance of this study,determines the scope of analysis and data samples according to the purpose of the study,and constructs the overall writing framework of the paper;secondly,by collecting some data on executive compensation of Listed Companies in different industries in China,it introduces them through simple data processing.In this paper,we use factor analysis and principal component analysis to evaluate the company value of Listed Companies in China.Finally,we use the nature of property rights as a moderator variable,divide three types of research samples to analyze the relationship between the two,and put forward corresponding policy recommendations.This paper finds that: executive compensation level is positively correlated with corporate value,and state-owned companies are more significant than non-state-owned companies;executive equity incentive has no significant correlation with corporate value,but is negatively correlated with the whole sample and non-state-owned enterprises,and positively correlated with the state-owned enterprises;on-the-job consumption is positively correlated with corporate value,and significantly correlated with the whole sample and non-state-owned enterprises,and in state-owned enterprises.Not significant.This paper argues that listed companies in China should establish a linkage mechanism between executive compensation and corporate performance,deepen the reform of enterprise system,set up equity incentive model in line with their own characteristics,and set up compensation committee.Fig.4,Table 16,63 references...