The Incentive Effect Of The Compensation Gap In China's Commercial Banks Research On Countermeasures

With the development of China's market economy,the income difference between enterprises themselves and many other industries is increasing.The financial industry,which is at the core of the economy,is higher than most industries in terms of salary level or pay gap.In recent years,with the increase of bank executives' pay gap at home and abroad,the relationship between executive pay and equity and performance has become the focus of public attention.The rapid rise of executive pay and performance decline in Chinese banks still receive high pay and huge income gap and other issues also aroused strong public doubt.With the opening of the financial market and the rapid development of the Internet finance,the competition of the traditional banking industry is becoming more and more competitive.It is a problem for every bank to be able to stand in an invincible position in the fierce social competition.A reasonable salary system is conducive to attracting high-end talents and motivating employees,so it is particularly important for commercial banks.This paper analyzes the performance of the salary gap between the executives of commercial banks and the ordinary employees and their staff,and analyzes the financial performance and the bad loan rate of the commercial banks.The paper analyzes the adjustment effect of the two position of the chairman and the general manager,the proportion of independent directors and the quality of property rights on the relationship between the two.The empirical research conclusions give policy recommendations for the compensation gap of commercial banks in China.The main conclusions of this paper include: in listed banks,the salary gap between senior executives and ordinary employees and executives will promote the performance of the bank;the proportion of independent directors has a weakening effect on the positive relationship between the salary gap and the bank performance;the length of the director and the general manager two will result in high performance.The management power is too big and the rate of non-performing loans has risen.the expansion of the salary gap between the senior executives of the state holding banks will increase the rate of bad loans compared with non-state-owned banks.The empirical research conclusions and policy recommendations in this paper have certain implications for regulating the pay gap of commercial banks in China and improving the governance of commercial banks.