The Empirical Study Of State-holding Enterprises On The Effect Of Executive Compensation On Performance

In recent years, the state-owned enterprises has experienced compensation reform,thus pay incentive subject of state-owned enterprises becomes a hot topic in thetheoretical circle. Previous research begains with the concept of monetary compensationto explore compensation incentive problem, but this paper adopts the generalizedconcept includes not only monetary compensation,but also the executives shareholdingand on-the-job consumption.Firstly,we define the concepts such as the state-ownedcompanies,executive compensation, and the cap-on-salary policy.Secondly,under theprecondition of analysis of the connection between managerial compensation andenterprise performance from the principal-agent theory, the optimal contract theory andthe operator incentive theory respectively, the research hypotheses are proposed in thispaper.Thirdly,we verify the hypotheses by using multiple regression analysis method.Based on the699A share state-owned holding listed companies, and choosing thedata from2007to2012, we verify the impacts of executive compensation incentive, thedifferent influences between central holdings and local holdings, and the differenteffects before and after the cap-on-salary policy. The results displayed that: Executivesmonetary compensation has significantly positive effect on enterprise achievement, andexecutives shareholding has not significantly active impact on business results, buton-the-job consumption has significantly negative incentive influence on coporateperformance; The active incentive effect of monetary compensation on the centralholdings is significantly higher but the negative incentive impact of on-the-jobconsumption is significantly lower than the local holdings; After the issue of thecap-on-salary policy, the positive incentive influence of monetary compensation ishigher than before, and the negative incentive impact of on-the-job consumption islower. So,for the sake of establishing more perfect state-owned enterprise remunerationincentive mechanism, the government need to promote the rationalization of executivecompensation structure so as to give full play the shareholding incentive effect; enhancetransparency of executives on-the-job consumption; perfect the mechanism of localholding companies pay management; Adhere to the executives the cap-on-salary policy.