Research On The Improvement And Theory Of Principal-agent Model Under Double Targets

As the main pillar of Chinese socialist market economy,The reform of state-owned enterprises is continuously focused by our society.With the promulgation of the working report of the 19 th national congress of the State Council of China,we gradually began stepping into the new stage of the property rights' reform of SOEs.However,the malaise of state-owned enterprises called the interest' conflict between principal and agent in the SOEs give the implementation of current reform cause the many operational dilemma of theory.Based on this background,how to comprehensively evaluate the performance of agents under the state property rights of SOEs dynamically and build a set of performance' mechanism that can motivate the agent become a research-topics that have much significance.Based on the theory of principal-agent model on the basic analysis paradigm,respectively for the optimal contract arrangement has the property of public goals with business objectives of contract arrangement of property rights,and based on the moral hazard of maximizing social welfare and economic profit maximization under the dual goal of principal-agent model combined with the entrepreneurial spirit of state-owned enterprise internal property dynamically optimal contract arrangement,in combination with multi-task principal-agent model,and dynamically analyzes the assessment of the contract of SOEs.Finally,combined with the background of state-owned enterprises,efforts for the agent cost function and create the benefit function of specific assumptions,through the derived finally determine the coefficient of the assessment of SOE agent contract.Research shows that:(1)in the framework of dual principal-agent model,agent to solve for the optimal coefficient of performance evaluation of state-owned enterprises,and get the optimal coefficient of performance appraisal is the coefficient of risk aversion of executives,the effort cost coefficient,efforts to the results of random variable variance function.This shows that the optimal performance assessment coefficient of the government is influenced by the correlation between the management strategy of the state-owned enterprise,the correlation between multi-task effort cost and the observability of multi-task effort results.(2)the agent on the two tasks of SOE to cost,there is mutually independent and substitute and complement each other,three kinds of circumstances,this paper discussed three kinds of correlation coefficient is the optimal coefficient of performance appraisal to the agent,the influence of showed that coefficient of performance appraisal should be set according to different environment;(3)the performance assessment coefficient of the contract is related to other environmental variables of the enterprise,such as enterprise strategy,environmental monitoring mechanism and human resource management mechanism.Therefore,the government should not only establish the performance appraisal mechanism reasonably,but also establish other enterprise mechanisms to cooperate with the implementation and jointly promote the realization of economic goals and environmental goals.