Study On The Double Principal-agent Model Of Listed Company

The listed companies are mainly regarded for its dispersivity feature of Stockholder's rights in traditional western principal-agent theory. The key of the theory is how to design an optimal governing structure and mechanism for ensuring that the agent(manager) works really representing the clients(the whole stockholders) benefits.The noticeable problem of modem company governing is to resolving the conflicts not only between the whole shareholders and the managers but also between the controlling shareholders and small & middle shareholders regarding to which stockholder's rights are relatively or highly concentrated. The traditional western principal-agent theory is not suitable to resolve the problem above. It is more reasonable to construct double-agency theory to resolve such problems.In this dissertation, a double agency model method with probability constrained on asymmetrical information condition is proposed. Regarding to the noticeable problem of invading small & middle shareholders'rights by the major or controlling shareholder, the participant constrain conditions are modified to probability constrain conditions based on the Holmstrom and Milgrom principal-agent model. The method can overcome the difficulty of determining agent utility function and solving the certain equivalent incoming. It helps to reduce the double-agency cost of the listed companies which stockholder's rights are relatively or highly concentrated. And also it helps to optimize the whole shareholders benefits maximally.