Debt Structure,Property Rights And Cash Dividend

The "The dividend puzzle" continue to attract the attention of the financial community.Rozeff(1982)pioneered the introduction of agency costs into dividend research,subsequently,the theory of dividend agency has gradually become an important theoretical basis for studying dividend payment,and its ability to interpret dividend behavior may be the most recognized by many scholars(Liu Xing et al.,2016).The proposal of dividend agency theory provides a new perspective for the research of the motive of dividend payment,but the early literature does not clearly indicate the mechanism of mutual influence between dividend payment and agency cost,that is the improvement of corporate govermance and the promotion of dividend payment,or the payment of cash.Dividend reduce agency costs and improve corporate governance.La Porta et al.(2000)proposed a“outcome model,and an"alternative model" to examine the relationship between dividend and agency costs from a governance perspective.The results validate the "outcome model" and suggest that high cash dividend originate from corporate governance improve.This research has made an important contribution to the development of dividend agency theory.Later,some scholars have proved that the level of governance is an important factor affecting the distribution of dividend.The improvement of corporate governance can promote dividend payment and fully support the "outcome model"(Mitton,2004;Jirapom et al.,2011).Chinese scholars also use the theory of dividend agency as the cornerstone to study cash dividend from the perspective of internal corporate governance and external institutions.Most of the literature shows that with the continuous improvement of China's legal system,the "outcome model" can more effectively explain the listed companies' cash dividend behavior in China(Xiao Zuoping and Su Zhongqin,2012;Liu Yinguo et al.,2015;Liu Xing et al.,2016).As an external governance mechanism,the governance effect of debt has been recognized by many scholars(Yuan Hongqi,2001;Williamson,1988;Hart,1995).The ownership and control of the company are separated,the information between the creditors,shareholders and management is asymmetric,and the agency problem arises.The research shows that the introduction of debt can effectively alleviate the problem of agency between managers and shareholders.It is believed that the control of corporate cash flow is the main way for management to achieve private profits Debt financing can put capital in market supervision and introduce debt treaty to benefit creditors.Putting it into the scope of legal protection,legalizing its own supervision and governance behavior,the pressure on management will increase,it will reduce the management,s dominance and encroachment on the company's cash flow,and greatly improve govermance,liberating the company cash flow is dominated by management(Easterbrook,1984;Jensen,1986).The governance effect of debt can explore the impact on cash dividend from the perspective of external governance.According to the "outcome model" of dividend agents,this thesis believes that cash dividend are the result of corporate governance.Debt governance mechanism can effectively improve corporate govermance and promote cash dividend payment.At the same time,unlike many literatures that study the overall governance effect of debt,this thesis divides debts according to term and source structure,uses short-term debt ratio to measure debt maturity structure,and uses commercial credit ratio to measure debt source structure,in order to measure debt more accurately.The impact of govermance on the company can also more clearly identify the different effects of the choice of internal debt structure on cash dividend.At the same time,taking full account of the background of the property rights system of China's emerging and transitional economy,the government still plays an important role in resource allocation.State-owned enterprises have an important influence on their business decisions because of their special political and social responsibilities.The impact of the nature of property rights on the relationship between debt structure and cash dividend enriches the studyThe thesis is divided into the following six sections:The first part is an introduction.The problems to be studied in this thesis are mainly proposed by analyzing the research background.The second part of the literature review.This part mainly analyzes and summarizes the cash dividend and debt structure for related literatures at home and abroad,and reviews the literature.The third part is the theoretical basis and research hypothesis.The theoretical starting point of this thesis includes information asymmetry theory,principal-agent theory,debt governance theory,and dividend agent theory.According to the background of property rights in China,the thesis analyzes the impact of debt structure on cash dividend.Based on the above theory,the research hypothesis is proposed.The fourth part is the empirical design.This section has carried out reasonable and effective empirical design for research hypothesis,including sample selection,data source,variable definition,measurement method selection and model design.The fifth part analyzes the empirical results.According to the model set in this thesis,the empirical research on the selected data samples is carried out,and the regression results of debt structure,property rights and eash dividend is presented,which proves the research hypothesis of this thesis.In the robustness test section,the regression results are fully proved by transformation models,variable substitution,and semi-mandatory dividend grouping.The sixth part of the research conclusions,policy recommendations and limitations.By analyzing the results of debt structure and cash dividend,we propose corresponding policy recommendations from the perspective of companies,investors and regulators,and point out the space for future research to be improved and developed.Based on the data of China A-shares from 2009 to 201 7,this thesis examines the impact of different debt structure governance mechanisms on cash dividend.The study found that debt maturity structure and debt source structure governance mechanisms can effectively promote cash dividend.It is further found that in areas with high marketization,the governance effects of debt maturity structure and debt source structure can significantly increase the cash dividend of state-owned enterprises.The research contribution of this thesis has two main points:First,the research on the motivation of cash dividend payment has been expanded.By combing the current research results,it is found that scholars' research on the factors affecting cash dividend mostly focus on internal governance and external institutional environment,and the research on payment motivation has not been determined.This thesis starts from the perspective of external debt governance,finds the governance channel of debt structure for cash dividend,and expands the research on the factors affecting cash dividend.Second,it has enriched research related to debt governance.The research conclusions of debt governance mechanism have been recognized by many scholars,but the research on the governance channels of cash dividend by different debt structures still needs to be enriched.This thesis divides the debt structure,finds the differences in governance mechanisms under different structures,and enriches the research on debt govermance mechanisms.