The Inhibitory Effect Of Corporate Transparency Of Listed Subsidiaries On Private Benefits Of Control Of Parents

It is common for controlling shareholders to take advantage of asymmetric information to gain benefits of control.How to protect the interests of small and medium shareholders from infringement is one of the key research issues in Management these days.How to prevent listed subsidiaries from gaining benefits of control by their controlling parent companies also needs to be discussed and solved urgently.From the perspective of the evolution of corporate governance theory,the traditional corporate governance theory advocates that the parent company has a core position,and the "one-way governance" of parent and subsidiary companies based on this is the fundamental reason why the interests of small and medium shareholders in listed companies are difficult to be protected.Company transparency is an important manifestation of its autonomy.Improving the transparency of listed subsidiaries can prevent the parent company from seizing benefits of control,thus effectively protecting the interests of small and medium shareholders.Based on the background above,this paper,from the perspective of the two-way governance of parent-subsidiary companies and on the basis of the theory of reference-dependent preference,explores the mechanism of the transparency of listed subsidiaries on the benefits of control of the parent company's control rights.At the same time,this paper also takes all A-share listed subsidiaries in China from 2013 to 2017 as samples to empirically test the relationship between transparency of listed subsidiaries and self-interest of parent company's control rights.Furthermore,the effectiveness of the above-mentioned main effect relationship is further tested by taking the degree of legal protection of small and medium-sized investors,an external market environment characteristic variable,and the proportion of independent directors,an enterprise characteristic variable,as regulatory variables.At the same time,we will further discuss the impact of property rights on the above-mentioned relations.Through the analysis of relevant theories and the empirical test of sample companies,this paper finally draws the following conclusions:(1)Improving the transparency of listed subsidiaries can effectively inhibit the parent company's behavior of seizing benefits of control,thus protecting the interests of small and medium shareholders.Further research found that in the context of state-owned listed subsidiaries,the transparency of listed subsidiaries has a more significant inhibitory effect on the parent company's self-interest behavior of seizing benefits of control.(2)The degree of legal protection for small and medium-sized investors can significantly enhance the inhibitory effect of transparency of listed subsidiaries on the private interests of the parent company's control rights.(3)The higher the proportion of independent directors,the stronger the inhibitory effect of the transparency of listed subsidiaries on the private interests of the parent company's control rights.Further analysis of the classification of property rights shows that in the situation of non-state-owned listed subsidiaries,the proportion of independent directors has a more significant positive moderating effect on the relationship between the transparency of listed subsidiaries and the self-interest of the parent company's control rights.