Multiple Large Shareholders,property Right Nature And Inefficient Investment Of Enterprises

Investment activities are important business decision-making activities of enterprises,and the investment efficiency of enterprises largely determines the value of enterprises.However,a large number of studies on investment efficiency show that there are widespread problems of over-investment and under-investment in listed companies of China,which hinders the steady and healthy development of the national economy.At the same time,the existing researches show that the ownership structure of multiple large shareholders is widespread in both China and the world.In China's listed companies,the sample of large shareholders with two or more shares of at least 10%accounts for more than 25%of the total sample.On the one hand,the existence of multiple large shareholders may play a dual governance role.Through non-controlling shareholders' supervision of controlling shareholders and senior executives,it will suppress information asymmetry and agency problems of enterprises,improve investment efficiency,alleviating excessive investment and insufficient investment.On the other hand,it may also lead to the formation of collusion among several major shareholders,which will not be able to play a supervisory role and aggravate the problem of inefficient investment.Therefore,the influence of multiple large shareholding structure on the investment efficiency of enterprises is an empirical problem that needs to be verified.In addition,the property rights system not only affects economic development and resource allocation on a macro level,but also affects the business decision-making activities and daily management at the micro level.In enterprises with different property rights,the role that multiple large shareholders can play will be different,which will lead to different impacts on the efficiency of enterprise investment.This thesis further studies the relationship between the shareholding structure of multiple large shareholders and the inefficient investment of enterprises from the perspective of property right.The content of this thesis consists of six parts:The first part is the introduction,this part mainly describes the research background and research significance of this thesis,the research content and the methods used by this thesis,as well as the possible innovations.The second part is literature review,which summarizes and reviews the existing literature of multiple large shareholders,property rights and corporate inefficient investment.And the third part is the theoretical analysis and research hypothesis,this part firstly defines the core concept of this thesis,and then expounds the theoretical basis of this thesis,finally,the research hypothesis of this thesis is put forward after detailed theoretical analysis.The fourth part is the research design of this thesis,this part explains the sample selection criteria,data sources and variable measurement methods of this thesis,and establishes the empirical model of this thesis.The fifth part is the empirical analysis,this part understands the basic characteristics of the main research variables by descriptive statistics,comparison test between groups and correlation analysis of the research samples,and then verifies the relevant research hypotheses by performing multiple regression analysis on the samples,the robustness of the research conclusions is verified by different kinds of robustness tests.The sixth part is the research conclusions and policy recommendations,this part elaborates the research conclusions of this thesis,and puts forward relevant policy recommendations and the shortcomings of this thesis and the prospects for further research in the future on this basis.The main conclusions of this thesis are as follows:Firstly,multiple large shareholders can play a supervisory role and generate dual governance effects,constrain the behavior of controlling shareholders and business managers,ease the degree of information asymmetry and agency problems,and restrain the overall inefficient investment level of enterprises,reducing the degree of over-investment and under-investment;secondly,compared with state-owned enterprises,non-state-owned enterprises face less government intervention,and large shareholders are more capable and motivated to participate in corporate governance,which can better play a supervisory role and improve corporate inefficient investment issues.The innovations of this thesis are mainly reflected in the following two aspects:First of all,this thesis provides a new research perspective on the relationship between equity structure and corporate inefficient investment behavior.Although the existing research has found that the balance between major shareholders can alleviate the problem of inefficient investment of enterprises from the perspective of equity checks and balances,there are still many differences in the concept of multiple large shareholders and equity checks and balances,and the definition of multiple large shareholders is more comprehensive.On the one hand,the definition of multiple large shareholders has made a requirement for the shareholding ratio of large shareholders,but the balance of shareholder power does not consider the shareholding ratio of shareholders and whether they can really have a significant impact on the daily operation and management of the enterprise.On the other hand,the research on relationship of the inefficient investment of enterprises and balance of shareholder power has not merged the shareholding ratio of people acting in concert.In the definition of the multiple large shareholders,this thesis merges the shareholding ratio of the concerted action people according to the information disclosed in the company's annual report,which will greatly reduces the deviation of the research conclusion.Secondly,this thesis expands the research objects of multiple large shareholders and enterprise inefficient investment.At present,domestic scholars have less research on the relationship between multiple large shareholders and enterprise inefficient investment,and mainly focus on family enterprises.The research samples are few and the coverage is relatively narrow.The research in this thesis takes China's A-share listed companies as samples,research on the impact of multiple large shareholding structure on inefficient investment of enterprises,which is more comprehensive in research object and improves the reliability of research conclusions.This thesis considers the nature of the property rights of the company when studying the impact of multiple large shareholders on inefficient investment in the enterprise,which enriches the literature related to property rights and corporate governance.