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Can Sponsor Supervision Improve The Information Disclosure Level Of Listed Companies?

Posted on:2020-07-14Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:Y Y GuoFull Text:PDF
GTID:2439330602966770Subject:Financial management
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
In 2019,science and technology innovation board is officially launched and?opinions on the implementation of setting up a science and innovation board and pilot registration system in Shanghai stock exchange?clearly stipulates that the information disclosure of issuers should be standardized.The operation of capital market is inseparable from information,and the information disclosure quality of information publishers plays a crucial role in the transparency and operation efficiency of capital market.Information asymmetry is an important factor restricting the development of China's capital market.True,accurate,complete and sufficient information disclosure is an effective way to alleviate information asymmetry.With the limited time and energy of the regulatory agencies,China actively relies on the power of professional institutions to supervise the information disclosure of listed companies,and strives to improve the information disclosure system and reduce violations of the information disclosure.Sponsor system has been implemented in China for more than ten years.The sponsor has the duty to coach the issuer before the listing and to supervise the issuer continuously after the listing.An important part of the sponsor's work in the continuous supervision period is to supervise the listed companies to disclose information legally and in compliance.From the perspective of system design,before listing,the sponsor plays the role of underwriter at the same time.Therefore,the role of sponsors cannot be well investigated in the issuing stage.In the continuous supervision period,the role of sponsor can exclude the influence of the role of underwriter.This paper mainly includes the following seven parts:The first part is the introduction.Firstly,this part elaborates the background and research significance of the topic,proposes the research purpose,research method and research framework of this paper and on this basis,explains the innovation points of this paper compared with existing researches.The second part is the institutional background.This part introduces the evolution and development status of China's sponsor system and the regulatory structure of China's sponsor system,and introduces the regulatory structure from three perspectives:the qualification system,the responsibility system and the legal responsibility system.The third part is literature review.This part reviews the literatures involved in this paper from the perspectives of sponsor system and information disclosure,and comments on previous relevant literatures.The fourth part is the related principle and hypothesis.This part first elaborates the theoretical basis,including information asymmetry theory,stakeholder theory and signal transmission theory.Based on the logical deduction of the basic theory and the existing literature conclusions,this paper expounds the function mechanism of the sponsor,and puts forward three hypotheses of this paper.The fifth part is research design.The research design section first introduces the sample source and the selection principle,then explains the measurement methods of explanatory variables,explained variables,instrumental variables and control variables,and finally proposes five research models of this paper.The sixth part is the analysis and test of the empirical results.This part firstly makes descriptive statistics of main variables.Secondly,the correlation test of the main variables involved in this paper is carried out.Meanwhile the collinearity of the model is tested.Then3 multiple regression analysis is carried out according to the empirical model,and the empirical results are obtained.Finally,the robustness of the empirical results was tested by changing the regression method and sample size.The seventh part is research conclusions and Suggestions.This part first elaborates the research conclusion of this paper,then deduces to the actual field,and proposes policy suggestions for relevant regulatory agencies.Finally,the shortcomings of this study and the futUre research direction are explained.The empirical results of this paper show that:(1)The sponsor's on-site supervision during the continuous supervision period can improve the information disclosure of the issuer.(2)The longer the issuer is supervised by the sponsor in the year of listing,the higher the information disclosure level of the issuer will be.(3)The change of sponsors during the continuous supervision period will reduce the level of information disclosure.The longer the issuer accepts the sponsor's supervision in the year of listing,the less the negative impact of the change of sponsor's representative.The innovation of this paper lies in that it not only discusses the influence of sponsor supervision on information disclosure,but also studies the influence of sponsor supervision time on information disclosure.In addition,this paper introduces the moderating variable--change of sponsor,and discusses the influence of sponsor supervision time on information disclosure from the perspective of sponsor change.It provides a novel idea for the issuer to improve the current situation of information disclosure and a reference for the regulatory authorities to regulate the quality of information disclosure.Finally,the research design of this paper introduces the instrumental variable-the passing time of CSRC approval,through which endogeneity is well controlled.However,due to the limitation of the author's research ability and time,this paper mainly studies the influence of sponsor supervision on the information disclosure of listed companies.The influencing factors such as listing system and information disclosure regulatory requirements in different time periods in China are not further discussed.
Keywords/Search Tags:Sponsor System, Continuous supervision, the Quality of Information Disclosure, the Time Lag of Information Disclosure
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