Research On The Influence Of Ownership Structure On Agency Cost Of Listed Companies

Since the establishment of capital market in our country,the scale has been continuously expanded and it has grown very rapidly.However,due to the late start,the capital market system was not perfect,and there were many incidents such as insider trading,market manipulation,and information disclosure violations.In fact,the violation of the interests of investors stems from the issue of principal-agent.Entrusted agents have always been a hot topic in corporate governance and are the focus of research by many domestic and foreign scholars.The traditional principal-agent theory believes that due to the inconsistent interests of management and shareholders,the interests of shareholders are damaged.Due to the special institutional background in China,most listed companies are reformed from state-owned enterprises.The shareholding structure of listed companies has the problems of "one big share",low shareholding ratio of management,and low level of investor protection.The two types of agency costs seriously damage the interests of investors,affect the efficiency of the company's governance,and are not conducive to the healthy development of the capital market.Improving the governance mechanism of listed companies,reducing the cost of equity agency,and strengthening investor protection are necessary conditions for the sustainable and healthy development of listed companies in China.In this context,this paper refers to relevant domestic and foreign literatures,based on the existing research conclusions,considers the intermediary role of investor protection,and also explores the marginal effect of ownership structure on agency costs.The two types of agency costs and the related literature on investor protection,clarifies the research status of the selected topics,and based on the principal-agent theory and tunneling effect.Theoretical,incomplete contract theory,management equity incentives and investor protection related views,from the theoretical level,analyze the relationship between equity concentration,equity balance,management shareholding ratio and two types of equity agency costs and investors Protection suggests a possible intermediary role between the two,and proposes research hypotheses.Based on the research methods of the existing literature,the financial data of the main board listed manufacturing companies in 2013-2017 were collected,and the statistical data was used to descriptive statistics and correlation analysis of the relevant data,and the data was performed using the fixed effect model.Regression analysis,and according to the mediation effect test process,the listed company's annual report audit opinion type is used as a variable to describe the strength of investor protection at the company level,and analyzes the mediating effect of investor protection.Then,in order to further explore the impact of ownership structure on agency costs,the quadratic term of explanatory variables was added to the original regression model to explore the marginal effect of ownership structure on the cost of two types of agency,further enriching the ownership structure and agency costs.The conclusion of the study of the relationship.The research results of this paper show that the concentration of ownership has a significant U-shaped relationship to the two types of agency costs.Investor protection has a cover-up effect in the relationship between equity concentration and two types of agency costs;equity balance has the first type of agency cost.Negative effect,but the result is not significant,and has a positive effect on the second type of agency cost,but the result is also not significant.Although the equity balance has no significant direct impact on the two types of agency costs,it will affect the investor protection level.Significant indirect impact on the second type of agency costs;The management shareholding ratio is U-shaped with the first type of agency costs,and is negatively related to the second type of agency costs,and there is a significant cover-up effect between investor protection in management shareholding ratio and two types of agency costs.Based on the above empirical results,this paper draws some inspirations from how listed companies can reduce agency costs:listed companies should establish appropriate reduction of equity concentration,and rationally use the advantages of equity incentives to increase management shareholding,but because of investor protection There is a cover-up effect between the management shareholding ratio and the two types of agency costs.Increasing the shareholding ratio of the management will also reduce the company's investor protection level.Therefore,we must pay attention to improving the investor protection level while improving the shareholding structure.The effect of investor protection on agency costs is weakened by the hidden effect of investor protection between equity structure and agency costs.The innovation of this paper is based on the mediation effect test process to test the mediation effect of investor protection in equity concentration,equity balance,management shareholding ratio and two types of agency costs,and based on the linear model.The high-order term of explanatory variables was added to further explore the marginal effect of ownership structure on agency costs.