A Study On Ownership Structure Of Chinese Listed Firms And Investor Protection

The pattern and performance of corporate governance are affected by the ownership structure to a great extent, and the ownership structure is determined by the legal protections of investors in a country. On the logic bases, this paper tries to explain corporate governance problems related to the ownership structure from the perspective of investor protection.This paper summarized the effect by which law and institution affect ownership structure. The minority shareholders incline to "hitch", while the big shareholders have motility to monitor managers and motive to expropriate minority shareholders. The expropriation has damaged the interests of the minority shareholders and influenced the companies' financing pattern, impels the ownership structure to be centralized, and affects the efficiency of corporate governance, thus holds the corporation valuation down.At present, the law and institution about investor protection have already been set up in our country. However, they have a lot insufficiency compared with the western countries'. In listing firms, one of the distinct characteristics is "one share is big alone", the proportion of the state-owned share is extremely high. This ownership structure adapts to the poor shareholder protections, although it has its special historical reasons.Based on the investor protection theory, this paper discusses how to improve Chinese listed firms' ownership structure. First of all, we should put it overall thinking, and then can orderly and healthily take measures from these points: consummating the legal protections of investors, optimizing the ownership structure, building the culture of corporate governance and etc.