Equity Pledge,Institutional Investor Heterogeneity And Quality Of Information Disclosure

Equity pledges have shown an upward trend in recent years,and many negative economic consequences behind this phenomenon have also followed.Combining with the previous literature,it is found that few scholars have studied equity pledge from the perspective of the quality of information disclosure and using the heterogeneity of institutional investors as a regulating factor.Therefore,this article aims to explore how equity pledges affect the quality of information disclosure and whether stable institutional investors can alleviate the problem between major shareholders and small and medium-sized shareholders.This article takes the data of Shenzhen Stock Market listed companies from 2013 to 2018 as a sample,and uses the comprehensive classification of remaining pledge duration,pledge frequency and institutional investor heterogeneity as the entry point for group regression.The study found that equity pledges will significantly reduce the quality of information disclosure and companies with higher pledge ratios have lower information disclosure quality;Treat institutional investors as heterogeneous groups,of which stable institutional investors can significantly improve the quality of corporate information disclosure;Stable institutional investors play a significant positive regulatory role in restricting pledged shareholders to manipulate information disclosure.Using a composite taxonomy for institutional investors,it is found that institutional investors who have independent business relationships,can resist the performance pressure of the invested companies,and have a stable trading strategy and value long-term value investment can play a positive regulatory role to the greatest extent.By refining the pledge characteristics,it is found that the more stable the institutional investors in the company-with the longer remaining pledge period and the lower pledge frequency,the more effectively it can monitor the information disclosure manipulation caused by the pledge of large shareholders.In summary,alleviating the negative effects of equity pledges can be considered from the following:Firstly,strengthen the dynamic supervision of the pledge behavior of large shareholders,especially the supervision of shareholders with high pledge ratio,long pledge period and high pledge frequency;Secondly,encourage institutional investors to establish a stable investment climate,better guide the majority of small and medium investors to make correct investments;Thirdly,improve the internal governance environment of the company,give full play to the internal governance role of the company,let the voice of small and medium shareholders be smoothly communicated to the supervision department in order to investigate the illegal pledge behavior in time and eliminate many hidden dangers caused by the pledge of equity.