The Research On The Relationship Between Institutional Ownership And Disclosure Quality

In the information age, the capital market is actually an information market. The disclosure of listed companies is the core content of information disclosure system in the stock market. As the result of disclosure, disclosure quality is an important an important evaluation index of the capital market efficiency. Disclosure of high quality is also the basis of corporate governance and effective guarantee to the supervision for the company. Institutional investors have grown up with the development of Chinese economy which is in the period of transition. Institutional investors have information superiority that individual investors can not be compared with. Driven by the principle of cost-effective; they would uphold shareholder activism and perform the obligations of owner to supervise the operation of company. As a result, institutional investors have an incentive to care about the company's information disclosure. In an anther word, the quality of disclosure would have an effect on the holding behavior of the Institutional investors. In the context of proper classification to Institutional investors and companies, by using the research method of combining standardized and empirical research methods we analysis and prove that different kinds of institutional investors and institutional investors in different company have different relationship between institutional ownership and disclosure quality. By using empirical research methods, we find that the whole institutional investors will choose a better information transparency company to hold. But when we divide the whole institutional investors in to different kinds of institutional investors, we find that only such three types of institutional investors will choose a better information transparency company to hold: securities investment fund, collective investment product and trust and Investment Company. Other institutional investors such as insurance company, social security fund, securities Investment Company, financial company and QFII will not choose a better information transparency company to hold. When we divide the companies in my sample into two groups, we find that in the group with lower shareholding of institutional investors, the whole institutional investors will choose a better information transparency company to hold, and in the group with higher shareholding of institutional investors, the whole institutional investors will choose a better information transparency company to hold.In this dissertation,the innovations are: First,for persecution of disclosure quality, we test institutional investors'selection activity, which is consistent with the trend in the field. Second,the research go under the heterogeneity of institutional investors, what makes up for gaps in current research.