Empirical Analysis Of Institutional Investors' Impact On The Performance Of Listed Companies

Institutional investors can supervise managers by participating in corporate governance,which not only inhibits the increase in agency costs,but also regulates internal controls,thereby promoting the improvement of business operation quality.A certain degree of equity balance is conducive to the exercise of power by small and medium shareholders led by institutional investors.However,when the internal shareholding of the invested company is too scattered,the struggle between shareholders will make shareholders ignore the supervision of management.Institutional investors need to spend more energy to participate in corporate governance.When the cost of participation is greater than the benefits,institutional investors will choose to ignore internal governance deficiencies,which is not conducive to the company's improvement in operating efficiency.This article takes companies listed in Shenzhen and Shanghai from 2016 to 2018 as a research sample,and uses relevant theories to empirically test the impact of different types of institutional investors on corporate performance.In addition,it further explores the regulating role played by the equity balance.The final conclusion is that:independent institutional investors can improve corporate performance,non-independent institutional investors have no significant relationship with corporate performance;agency costs play a part of mediate role in the process of independent institutional investors affecting corporate performance;equity balance degree negatively regulates the mediate role of agency cost.