A Study On The Impact Of Fund Holding On Large Shareholders' Emptying Behavior

Companies represent the interests of various subjects,and how to effectively solve corporate governance issues has always been a difficulty.Our country's shareholding model is relatively concentrated,and large shareholders can exercise their own supervisory powers and supervise managers' behavior decisions to maximize the company's interests.However,some scholars believe that due to the high degree of separation of control and cash flow rights,there are also conflicts between large shareholders and small shareholders of listed companies.Although a highly concentrated shareholding will encourage large shareholders to exercise their own supervisory powers,it will also widen the risk gap between shareholders with different shareholding ratios.Because the capital market follows the risk-return balance principle and the cost-benefit principle,when the operating income obtained by the large shareholders far exceeds the cost,the agency problem between shareholders and managers is weakened,and the agency problem between large shareholders and small shareholders is Will be highlighted.Large shareholders may use their own shareholding advantages to interfere in various decisions in the operation and management process through various means,and secretly transfer the assets and interests of listed companies to their own hands,thereby plundering resources and emptying the company,realizing private interests of control,seriously damage the company's interests.Through the research and analysis of the role of the major shareholder hollowing out,it is mainly manifested in the major defects of internal control and the relatively weak internal governance mechanism.These factors have created a convenient environment for the large shareholder hollowing out.From the external point of view,it is shown that the supervision of laws and regulations is very low,and it is difficult to fundamentally effectively restrict the hollowing out behavior of large shareholders.For developed countries,institutional investors can increase company value by supervising managers and restrict large shareholders from emptying.Due to the huge difference between the shareholding structure of China's listed companies and Western developed countries,studies have analyzed the relationship between company performance and institutional investor's shareholding ratio,and found that institutional investor's shareholding can play a positive role in China's listed company governance effect.Institutional investors in China are mainly composed of investment funds,social security funds and QFII.In China,securities investment funds account for the highest proportion.The fund raises a large amount of funds from most investors for professional investment management and business decision-making,and bears the corresponding investment returns and risks.The development of my country's institutional investor market is uneven,and the average share of securities investment funds is much higher than other institutional investors,which makes securities investment funds show excellent governance advantages.Existing studies have found that the use of the signal effect of funds in the governance of listed companies can quickly respond to the market and play a role in supervising and restricting large shareholders.From the perspective of the securities investment fund,this paper deeply studies its mechanism of action on the hollowing out of large shareholders,and finds that fund holdings can have a restrictive effect on the hollowing out of large shareholders through executive compensation incentives.Three conclusions were finally drawn:(1)The concentration of fund holdings has a restraining effect on the hollowing out behavior of large shareholders.The higher the fund's shareholding ratio,the lower the degree of large shareholders' hollowing out.(2)The checks and balances of the fund's shareholding have an inhibitory effect on the hollowing out behavior of large shareholders.(3)Among the state-owned enterprises,the fund's shareholding has a significant check and balance effect on the hollowing out of large shareholders.For fund companies,the empirical research conclusions of this paper help fund companies adjust their investment policies according to the checks and balances of their hollowing out behavior with large shareholders and their impact on corporate governance.For listed companies,the research on the impact of the holding behavior of securities investment funds and the hollowing out behavior of large shareholders can effectively help companies improve their own governance structure,and is also crucial for improving their shareholding structure and company performance.This article takes listed companies including Chinese securities investment funds as targets,and combines theoretical analysis and empirical models to conduct research,and summarizes domestic and foreign literature,summarize and sort out the relevant concepts and basic theories of securities investment funds participating in corporate governance,and study the effect of fund holdings on hollowing out behavior of major shareholders,The relationship between the holding of securities investment funds and corporate governance is studied from two aspects: the concentration of fund holdings and the balance of equity.