A Study On The Governance Paths Of Large Shareholders Tunneling Behavior

The “empty” of major shareholders mainly refers to the assumption that the major shareholders of listed companies are based on the economic person's assumptions,in order to maximize the personal benefits,use the advantages of equity concentration,information and other advantages to transfer resources that are not their own to themselves through some means,thereby An act that encroaches on the interests of listed companies and other small and medium shareholders.Taking Revitalization Biochemical as an example,major shareholders have repeatedly carried out mergers and acquisitions with related parties,taking the opportunity to implement “hollowing”behaviors to invade the interests of listed companies,although accounting firms have repeatedly issued risk warnings to Revitalization Biochemical,and the stock exchange has Large shareholders publicly condemn and punish,but it is difficult to stop the decline in business performance of the company,resulting in damage to the interests of small and medium shareholders and seriously affecting investor confidence.It is necessary to study the behaviors of major shareholders in “hollowing out” and governance paths,in order to protect the interests of investors,regulate the behavior of listed companies,and promote the healthy development of the capital market.This article takes 2011-2018 Shenzhen and Shanghai A-share manufacturing listed companies as a research sample,based on the economic person hypothesis,information asymmetry theory,principal-agent theory,and incomplete contract theory.It uses literature research,normative research,and empirical research.Methods: Based on the research results of relevant scholars,in order to check whether the nature of shareholders(the second largest shareholder of listed companies)is state-owned,state-owned listed companies and non-state-owned listed companies are divided into two groups,namely: the first group,state-owned listed companies The second group,state-owned listed companies,checks and balances shareholders are non-state-owned;the third group,non-state listed companies,checks and balances shareholders are state-owned;the fourth group,non-state listed companies,checks and balances shareholders are non-State-owned.Further,from the perspectives of internal governance(shareholding concentration,equity balance,independent director size)and external governance(external audit quality),the study of the "empty" behavior of major shareholders leads to the following four important conclusions:(1)equity concentrationIn the fourth group,that is,non-state-owned listed companies,when the check-and-balance shareholders are non-state-owned shareholders,the "hollowing" behavior of the major shareholders can be reduced.(2)Equity check and balance is in the second and third groups,that is,when the check and balance shareholders are heterogeneous shareholders,the equity check and balance can play a more effective role.(3)Independent directors in any of the four groups cannot effectively restrain the "hollowing" behavior of major shareholders.(4)In the third and fourth groups,the external audit is more effective in supervising non-state-owned listed companies.Based on the above research conclusions,this article puts forward policy recommendations to control the “hollowing” behavior of major shareholders by introducing heterogeneous checks and balances on shareholders,improving the management system of independent directors,and improving the quality of external audits.