The Influence Of The Remuneration Of Independent Directors On Stock Price Crash Risk

At present,China's A stock market has become the second largest stock market in the world.Accompanied by a sharp decline in stock prices,which has a great impact on both the interests of shareholders and the psychology of investors,and seriously interferes with the order of the capital market,the efficiency of resource allocation and the progress of the real economy.The factors that influence the collapse of stock prices include market trading,tax evasion,inefficient investment.Among them,the risk of the collapse of the company's stock price caused by the management covering bad news is particularly prominent,therefore,the independent director who is born with the function of supervision has attracted much attention from scholars.Considering the independence of independent directors,the existing researches on the supervision function of independent directors mainly focus on the individual characteristics of independent directors,such as their background,reputation,part-time job and geographical location.As for the arrangement of the independent director system,it mainly studies the proportion of independent directors.However,the academic circles have not reached a consistent conclusion on the governance role of the remuneration of independent directors.According to the hypothesis of rational economic man,compensation will have an impact on the governance of independent directors,and the applicability of the optimal contract theory in the compensation of independent directors needs to be confirmed by research.On this basis,this paper takes the data of a-share listed companies from 2009 to2017 as the research object,and discusses the corporate governance role of the remuneration of independent directors from the perspective of stock price collapse risk.The research aims are as follows: First,to verify whether the remuneration has incentive effect on the independent directors,and whether the remuneration of independent directors can influence the risk of the company's stock price crash;Second,whether the power of the management will affect the incentive of the remuneration of independent directors and the performance of the supervision function of independent directors.This paper empirically studies the relationship between the remuneration ofindependent directors and the risk of stock price crash,and analyzes the moderating effect of management power on the relationship between them,the mediating effect of earnings management on part of the relationship between them,and the moderating effect of the ratio of male sole directors on the relationship between them.The conclusion is that:the compensation of independent directors is negatively correlated with the risk of stock price crash.The greater the power of the management,the more significant the restraining effect of the remuneration of independent directors on the risk of stock price crash;earnings management plays a part in the mediation between the two,the higher the proportion of male independent directors is,the more significant the inhibition effect of independent directors' remuneration on the risk of stock price crash is.The innovation of this paper is to extend the application scope of the optimal contract theory to the field of compensation of independent directors,which provides evidence to support the academic view that independent directors play a supervisory role.In addition,it is believed that the more power the management has,the more supervision the independent directors will have.For the sake of personal reputation and career development,independent directors will work hard to prevent the stock price from collapsing due to major accidents.Enterprises should formulate reasonable compensation incentive policies to enable independent directors to give full play to their supervisory functions,and formulate more rigorous corporate governance systems to reduce executives' interference ability in board decisions.