Research On The Influence Of "Celebrity Independent Director" And Management Power On The Risk Of Stock Price Crash Of Listed Companies

The phenomenon of stock market volatility caused by the sharp drop in stock prices since the formation of the capital market has been the focus of attention of investors and market regulators.According to the early research from the perspectives of information asymmetry,stock price bubble hypothesis,and principal-agent conflict,the management's deliberate manipulation of real business news disclosure is one of the main reasons for the company's stock price crash risk.Both managers and investors pursue their own interests maximization goals.When there is a conflict of interest between the two,managers as the party that grasps the advantages of internal information resources,may use the control rights in their hands to delay disclosure or hide the negative news of business operations.After the introduction of the independent director system by domestic and foreign regulatory authorities,the situation of executives and shareholders overriding internal control has been gradually improved.However,since independent directors are not allowed to hold other positions in the company other than directors,the supervisory power is possibly ignored or swallowed by managers.Compared with ordinary independent directors,the media and the public have higher “attention” to independent directors with higher reputation status.Based on the motivation of maintaining reputation,independent directors have higher enthusiasm to supervise the effective implementation of internal control.Therefore,it is of great significance and value to study whether high-respecting independent directors can actively supervise management's manipulation of information disclosure in the context of reputational incentives and thus affect the risk of stock price crash.Through the analysis of the principal-agent theory and the management power theory,under the principal-agent conflict,it can be seen that the greater the power of the management,the greater the influence on the company's major decisions,thus weakening the internal and external supervision and manipulation of the disclosed business information.However,in the context of reputational incentives,independent directors have an incentive to suppress management's opportunistic behavior.Therefore,the paper adopts the 2013-2017 A-share listed company as a research sample,empirically testing the influence of management power and “celebrity independent director” on the stock price crash risk.First,considering the difference between the power of management in the sample group and the proportion of “celebrity independent directors”,the univariate analysis was used to initially test the differences between the groups.Secondly,by multiple regression analysis,the paper tests whether the power of management was different on the risk of stock price crash,and then analyzing whether the motivation of “celebrity independent director” to maintain reputation effectively inhibit the influence of management power on stock price crash risk;finally,considering the existence of individual differences among “celebrity independent directors”,the paper examines in the background of different behavioral characteristics and gender characteristics of “celebrity independent directors”,there is a difference in the influence of management power on the risk of stock price crash.The research results show that:(1)The greater the power of the company's management,the stronger the management's ability to use control to weaken internal and external supervision,and it is easier to hide negative news against the will of investors for the pursuit of its own interests,increasing the company's future stock price risk.(2)After the introduction of “celebrity independent director”,the study found that the listed company “celebrity independent director” has mitigated the impact of management power manipulation on the risk of stock price crash,but the inhibition effect is not significant.(3)After further research,it was found that when “celebrity independent directors” attended the meeting more frequently,the supervision and frequency of independent directors' supervision of the company were improved,enabling independent directors to identify management's opportunistic behavior in a timely manner,and the impact of the risk of stock price crash caused by the management power is small.(4)When a listed company has a female “celebrity independent director”,the ability of external supervisory forces to avoid risks to improve the quality of financial information is stronger,which weakens the influence of management power on the risk of stock price crash.