Is It Better For The Minority Shareholders Without Actual Controller?

The actual controller of listed companies has always been one of the hot issues in the research of capital market.Its positive effect on listed companies in China cannot be ignored.Meanwhile,there is also the phenomenon that the actual controller transfers the value of the company and occupies the interests of minority shareholders through various ways.In recent years,the number of companies without actual controllers has gradually increased in China.Some companies have improved governance structures,and their decision-making process is more fair and democratic,so they have high investment value.In addition,some listed companies compete for control rights due to dispersed stock rights,which has aroused wide attention.Therefore,under the special background of "single largest stock" and imperfect capital market in China,whether the absence of actual controller has a positive or negative impact on the interests of the company's minority shareholders is worth studying.Based on this background,this paper focuses on the issue of the interests of minority shareholders in listed companies without actual controllers in China,investigates the profit of minority shareholders in such companies,and finds the existing governance risks,providing new empirical evidence for the internal governance of listed companies and the protection of minority shareholders' rights and interests.The research content of this paper mainly includes the following three aspects: Firstly,the basic status of listed companies without actual controllers in China is summarized,and the impact of the lack of actual controllers on the interests of minority shareholders is analyzed;Secondly,empirical research is conducted on the relationship between the lack of actual controllers and the interests of minority shareholders in listed companies to verify the impact of the absence of actual controllers on the interests of minority shareholders;Thirdly,to protect the interests of minority shareholders in a company without actual controllers,effective countermeasures are put forward from the two aspects of perfecting the internal governance of the company and perfecting the external supervision.Empirical research finds that:(1)the lack of actual controller is negatively correlated with the degree of capital occupation,indicating that the lack of actual controller will reduce the degree of capital occupation of the listed company;(2)there is a negative correlation between the lack of actual controllers and the degree of cash dividend distribution,indicating that listed companies without actual controllers will reduce the cash dividend payment;(3)there is a significant negative correlation between no actual controller and corporate value,indicating that the absence of actual controller can reduce corporate value.It is concluded that the absence of actual controller in the listed company can reduce the company's capital occupation to a certain extent,and is conducive to the generation and implementation of favorable decisions for the development of the company and minority shareholders,as well as the interests of minority shareholders.However,at the same time,the absence of actual controllers may also cause a series of internal governance problems.It is more difficult for shareholders to unify their opinions so that a battle for control breaks out.It also may cause that the management takes control,which resulting in management to harm the interests of the company and shareholders.It affects the daily operation of the company,reduces the value of the company,and damages the interests of minority shareholders.