| The share transfer system of small and medium-sized enterprises(hereinafter referred to as"the new three board"),as a part of the multi-level capital market in China,has developed rapidly in recent years.From the end of 2013,the new three board market began to accept the application in the whole country.By the end of 2017,more than 11000 companies had been listed on the new three board.The rapid expansion has brought about the development of the market,and a series of problems have been exposed as well.Among them,the problem of capital occupation is very prominent.The problem of capital occupation has always been a common and difficult problem in Chinese capital market,and it has been repeatedly banned in Chinese main board market.Finally,through the cooperation of many forces,the problem of capital occupation finally disappeared in the main board market.But in recent years,with the development of the new three board market,the problem of capital occupation broke out again in the new three board market.For our small and medium-sized companies listed in new three board,due to its historical background is relatively simple,the major shareholder of the company may also serve as chairman and general manager,the phenomenon of "What I say goes" is normal.On the other hand,major shareholders usually have significant status in company,their internal and external networks are quite deep,so they can use a variety of subtle and complex ways of occupation to avoid external regulators.To solve this big problem,we can't just count on the administrative departments of supervision,and there are great difficulties in technology and manpower as well.Therefore,how to cure or prevent the problem of capital occupation in the new three board market has become an important problem to be solved urgently.Based on a thorough study of the case of Shikongke company exposed in 2016,this paper hopes to make some contributions to solve the problem of capital occupation in Chinese capital market.In the introductory part,the writer introduce the background of selecting the topic and comb the related literature data of former scholars,and then introduce the principal-agent theory,the control right income theory and the information asymmetry theory related to capital occupation.Then,taking the case of Shikongke company,this paper introduces the situation of funds occupied by the Shikongke company,including the specific means of capital occupation and the amount of funds occupied,and then analyzes the motivation and economic consequences of the Shikongke company's capital appropriation.Through case study,the reasons that Shikongke company occupied capital mainly include:first,the external macro economic environment is going down,traditional advertising industry is under great pressure;second,Shikongke company's lack of fuds management system;third,internal control deficiencies;fourth,external supervision is not perfect,can not adapt to the way of supervision;fifth,corporate controller,Wang,is lack of legal knowledge.Finally,it makes a lot of negative effect to the economy of the listed company itself,related shareholders,creditors and the capital market environment,including damage to corporate image and Customer Churn,labor turnover;stagnation of enterprise management;the company's stock trading is suspended and the small shareholders funds were tied up;The chain of funds is fractured,damaging the interests of creditors;reducing the confidence of investors and the function of resource allocation from the new three board market.Based on all these above,writer puts forward four suggestions:first,the company should develop a moderate business plan,to adapt to the external environment;second,to develop the "special fund management system",to prevent the funds occupation of big shareholders;third,improve the corporate governance structure,including perfecting internal control,the introduction of independent director and strengthen the role of the board of supervisors;fourth,improve the new three board's supervision system. |
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