Performance Expectation Gap,Internal And External Governance And Non-Efficiency Investment

Under-investment and over-investment are common in modern Chinese enterprises.The inefficient investment behavior of enterprises reduces the allocation efficiency of enterprise resources and hinders the increase of enterprise value.The negative impact of inefficient investment on enterprises has also aroused widespread concern in the academic community.The existing literature on inefficient investment governance mostly starts from board governance,executive incentives,and the institutional environment.In addition,Most of the researches about the relationship between company achievements and investment efficiency tend to take inefficient investment as independent variables,explore the impact of investment efficiency on company achievements,and pay little attention to the impact of performance expectation gap on corporate investment efficiency.According to performance feedback theory,The gap between actual performance and expected performance will lead the managements to adjust their investment strategies in order to achieve expected performance,thereby affecting the investment efficiency of the enterprise.Therefore,based on performance feedback theory,principal-agent theory and tournament theory,this paper makes a theoretical analysis of the relationship between performance expectation gap and inefficient investment,and further analyzes regulatory effect of audit supervision,legal environment and salary incentives.This article uses the data of Shanghai and Shenzhen A-shares 2012-2017 as a sample for correlation analysis,regression analysis and endogenous robustness test,and reached the corresponding conclusions.Based on the research conclusions,it provided relevant suggestions for corporate governance and the management of market regulators.Finally,it summarizes the limitations of this study and prospects for future research directions.This article draws the following conclusions:(1)Performance expectation gap has a significant impact on inefficient investment.The larger performance expectation gap,the greater the sense of crisis for managements.The stronger the motivation to achieve the expected performance by adjusting the allocation of corporate resources.At the same time,compared with the historical expected performance,the managements pay more attention to the gap between the actual performance and the industry expected performance.Therefore,the management's motivation to implement inefficient investments is under the pressure of the industry performance expected gap.(2)Audit supervision plays a significant role in regulating the relationship between performance expectation gap and inefficient investments.On the one hand,audit supervision,as an independent third party,helps to alleviate the degree of information asymmetry in the market.As an important part of the external supervision mechanism,audit supervision can restrain the irrational behavior of managers to a certain extent,thereby alleviating the inefficient investment behaviors made by managements under pressure from performance.(3)The improvement of the legal environment is conducive to guiding managements' investment behavior,thereby reducing the inefficient investment because of performance expectation gap,but the improvement of the legal environment does not work when managements in the face of historical performance expectations gaps.(4)salary incentives can improve managements' risk-bearing ability,thereby inhibiting them only invest in low-risk projects.At the same time,salary incentives can also coordinate the interests of management and shareholder,reduce agency costs,and improve corporate investment efficiency.Compared with external supervision,the salary incentive system implemented within the company has a stronger role in guiding and restricting managements' investment behavior.