| With the improvement of living standards,consumers' demand for food in terms of safety,hygiene,health,environmental protection,etc.is becoming more and more strict,and green food has been favored by more and more consumers.This article studies the question that a company decides whether to apply for green labels and whether it will actually produce to maximize its own profits,in a green food market where consumers are sensitive to both green food label certification and price.Based on the consumer choice behavior described by the utility function,combined with the government's regulatory mechanism and the actual situation of the enterprise in reality,a game model of the enterprise under three strategies of not applying for green labels,applying with real production,and applying with fraud was established to explore the best strategy choices for enterprises in different market and policy environments.First,we establish a basic model under unconstrained conditions,and analyze the optimal decisions of enterprise under different strategies and the applicable conditions for enterprise to choose different strategies.The results show that when the government punishment is greater than a certain threshold,consumers have limited trust in green labels,and enterprise will not choose fraud,either not apply for green labels,or apply with real production.Whether to apply depends on the effectiveness of the green label actually brought to consumers during real production.Conversely,when the punishment intensity is less than a certain threshold,consumers have a higher degree of trust in green labels,and companies will definitely apply for green labels.Whether to apply actual production depends on the actual increase in the effectiveness of green labels on real green food and counterfeit food.Secondly,government decision is incorporated into the game process.The government determines the supervision and punishment based on the policy goal of maximizing social welfare,and its impact on the optimal decision and strategic choice of the enterprise is analysed.The results show that under the policy objective of maximizing overall social welfare,The government's punishment policy is related to consumers' trust in green labels.When consumers have a low level of trust in green labels under weak government supervision,the government's incomplete crackdown policy maximizes social welfare,and enterprises will definitely choose fraud.When consumers have a higher trust in green labels,or when government supervision is stronger,the government adopts a laissez-faire policy to maximize overall social welfare.The government chooses the best regulatory effort to avoid fraud based on green food production cost and the utility increase of green food that consumers can identify.Finally,considering the different preferences of different types of consumers in the market,enterprise optimization models under three strategies of heterogeneous consumer constraints is established to analyze enterprise decisions,and the impact of heterogeneous consumer constraints on enterprise strategy choices is further discussed.The results show that the increase of consumers' sensitivity to food quality,the reduction of price sensitivity,and the increase in the proportion of quality consumers are all conducive to procuring enterprises to apply for green labels with real production.Heterogeneous consumer constraints have no decisive effect on the choice of enterprise strategy.Compared with unconstrained conditions,the differences are mainly reflected in the range and threshold of green food production costs that enterprises can accept,and the scope and threshold of government penalties.This article innovatively combines consumer choice behavior,enterprise strategy choices,and government to decide supervision and punishment based on the goal of maximizing social welfare,which is closer to reality and provides a scientific theoretical basis for companies and governments to make better decisions. |
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