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Study On The Adverse Selection And Moral Hazard Of Commercial Medical Insurance Market

Posted on:2009-04-27Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:C ChenFull Text:PDF
GTID:2189360242489709Subject:Social security
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
As an important part of the social security system, the reform of medical insurance system takes the establishment of medical insurance system for urban workers as a core, the commercial medical insurance for the supplement multi-level medical security system as a goal. The commercial medical insurance as an aspect of the medical security system, its function is noticeable. Specially, as a kind of supplement insurance, not only it can meet the supplement medical insurance needs of employers as well as employees, but also provide direct reference in many technical areas for the basic medical insurance. Therefore, this article conducts the medical security research in the perspective of commercial insurance and will carry on the thorough study on the adverse selection and moral hazard of commercial medical insurance, in order to deepen the commercial medical insurance research, in the mean time, provide reference for the entire social medical security system.In recent years, with the development of social economy and the enhancement of people's income, people gradually think a lot of health and risk insurance of themselves. On one hand, with the gradual deepening of the reform of the medical insurance rule, the situation of medical treatment at public expense has been broken, and the situation that the government supported all the medical cost has been as a history. This makes an opportunity to the development of commercial medical insurance. On the other hand, because of the trend that people live older and older, the deterioration of environment as well as the application of new medical equipment and technology, people improve their need of medical treatment greatly, this deepens the urgent need of commercial medical insurance. However, compare with the increasing demand, the development of medical insurance at the present time is quite slow. In fact, many insurance companies are not that eager to set foot in commercial medical insurance and not willing to exploit the new product of medical insurance. So, what is the reason?The author thinks that the constant expansion of medical expense is the key reason that insurance companies can not manage business in commercial medical insurance. How to control and reduce medical expenses' expansion is as difficult as real for insurance companies. This thesis starts from information economy, points that adverse selection and moral hazard caused by information asymmetric is the original reason that block the development of medical insurance, and analyzes and demonstrates how do the adverse selection and moral hazard come in being from the conception, characteristic and present difficulty of commercial medical insurance. Then, this paper supports some idiographic measures and feasible play to keep away the adverse selection and moral hazard aim at the actual circumstances in China at present, through studying and analyzing the advanced technology and scientific operational mode of the insurance risk control in America.
Keywords/Search Tags:medical insurance, moral hazard, adverse selection, information asymmetric
PDF Full Text Request
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