Research On The Impact Of Stock Pledge Of Controlling Shareholders On Investment Efficiency Of Listed Companies

Since 2018,with the continuous decline of China's stock market,the stock market has frequently exploded.Equity pledge,a relatively new means of financing,has gradually come into the eyes of the public and attracted the attention of all parties.As one of the core of modern corporate finance,the efficiency of investment has always been the focus of scholars.So what are the economic consequences of the pledge of controlling shareholders' equity,whether there is a relationship between the pledge of controlling shareholders' equity and investment efficiency,and what is the impact of the pledge of controlling shareholders' equity on investment efficiency,all of these are worthy of further study.In this paper,first of all,the controlling shareholder,equity pledge and investment efficiency are expounded.Based on the financing constraint hypothesis,including the principal agent,information asymmetry and other theories,etc.,the influence of equity pledge on investment efficiency of the controlling shareholder is analyzed and explained.This study uses the data of A-share listed companies from 2009 to 2018 as a benchmark,the selection of equity pledge proxy variables: 0 and 1 virtual variables and the total number of remaining pledge take up of the total equity of the listed company ratio variables,using Richardson(2006)model to calculate the investment efficiency,the controlling shareholder equity pledge and the relationship between the investment efficiency model,over-investment and under-investment grouping regression model and the state-owned listed companies and the excessive non-state-owned listed companies and investment group regression model to carry on the multiple regression analysis,and the results are obtained.The empirical results show that shareholder pledges are positively related to the company's invalid investment.The company's necessary commitments to the interests of the controlling shareholders are beneficial to the company's investment benefits,which is mainly reflected in the excessive investment.With the introduction of the property right,it is found that in the state-owned listed companies,the overinvestment of the equity pledge of the controlling shareholders is more significant.Then the robustness test is carried out by?If you replace the years between the data,the regression results will remain unchanged.Finally,based on the results of empirical research,this article puts forward relevant suggestions from the perspective of the pledgee,external investors and government regulatory departments,and some deficiencies in the existing research content of this paper are summarized,as well as the prospect of possible research directions in the future.