Research On The Impact Of Leverage Regulation On China's Commercial Bank Risk

After the outbreak of the global financial crisis in 2008,regulatory authorities and scholars in various countries began to recognize the inadequacy of the capital adequacy ratio as a regulatory tool.In 2010,Basel III came into being in the face of the problems exposed in the global financial crisis and some of the defects contained in Basel II.Basel III incorporates leverage into the prudential supervision system and sets a minimum leverage ratio of 3%,which provides some ideas for regulators in other countries to formulate their own leverage supervision.In 2011,my country Banking Regulatory Commission promulgated the "Measures for the Management of Commercial Bank Leverage Ratio",which established a system for the supervision of leverage ratio in my country.At the same time,compared with the minimum standard of Basel III,the minimum standard of leverage regulation in my country is one percentage point higher,that is,the minimum requirement is 4%.Since 2015,part of the funds of my country's commercial banks have been idle in the financial field,which has greatly increased the leverage of the banking industry.Therefore,the supervisory authority has issued a series of policies to promote the bank's funds to become virtual and to promote commercial banks to increase their own leverage ratio to avoid the occurrence of systemic risks.As a prudential supervision tool,has leverage ratio supervision achieved the original intention of reducing the risks of commercial banks? Since there are certain differences in the level of capital,risk appetite,and type of banks of commercial banks in my country,will this affect the regulatory effect of leverage on commercial bank risks? This article attempts to study these two issues to supplement the research on leverage ratio supervision and provide some ideas for further improving and refining my country's leverage ratio supervision system.First,based on the prudential supervision theory,risk preference theory,and information asymmetry theory,through the channel analysis of leverage ratio regulation affecting commercial bank risk and the heterogeneity analysis of leverage ratio regulation affecting commercial bank risk,it laid a solid foundation for empirical research in the future Theoretical basis.The study selected panel data of 75 commercial banks in China from 2008 to 2017,adopted the systematic GMM method,and verified the channel analysis of the impact of leverage ratio regulation oncommercial bank risk through empirical models,and tested the impact of leverage ratio regulation on commercial bank risk Heterogeneity analysis.According to the empirical results,three conclusions are drawn: first,the leverage ratio supervision tool achieves the original intention of reducing the risk of commercial banks;second,the capital level and risk appetite of commercial banks will make the difference in the leverage ratio supervision effect;third,for For listed banks,the effectiveness of leverage ratio supervision is better than that of unlisted banks,that is,leverage ratio supervision more effectively reduces the risks of listed banks.Finally,based on the research conclusions,five policy recommendations were put forward: first,adhere to the implementation of leverage ratio supervision and increase the supervision of commercial banks' leverage ratio disclosure;second,implement differentiated leverage ratio supervision for different commercial banks;third,Use leverage ratio in combination with other regulatory measures;Fourth,vigorously develop internal financing of commercial banks;Fifth,vigorously develop asset-light business.The innovation of this article is mainly reflected in the consideration of the heterogeneity of the impact of leverage ratio regulation on the risk of commercial banks and the recalculation of leverage ratio.