Research On The Influence Of CFO Who Also Serves As Secretary To The Board Of Directors On The Disclosure Of Performance Forecast

Accounting information disclosure is an important means to alleviate the information asymmetry between the management,shareholders and external stakeholders.The investment decisions made by investors largely depend on the information disclosed by the management.The information disclosure of listed companies has long been highly valued by the regulatory authorities in various countries.Although the CSRC has clearly stipulated the format,method and content of information disclosure for listed companies,there are still many insiders who strategically disclose information beyond the hard and fast rules.As the direct person in charge of the external statement,the position of the secretary of the board of directors has a self-evident influence on the information disclosure of listed companies.In recent years,with the increasing attention paid to the professional status of secretary to the board of directors,more and more listed companies have chosen the position of CFO as the secretary to the board of directors.As a publisher of information,will the change of having the CFO as the secretary of the board of directors affect the strategy of information disclosure by listed companies?Therefore,taking the performance forecast as the observation window,this paper explores the influence of CFO who also serves as secretary to the board of directors on the disclosure of performance forecast,and reveals the phenomenon of selective disclosure of accounting information of listed companies in China and its market reaction.Based on principal-agent theory,signal transmission theory,investor limited attention theory and executive echelon theory,this paper selects quarterly,mid-term and annual performance forecasts of a-share listed companies in Shanghai and shenzhen stock exchanges from 2011 to 2017 as research samples.The results show that: first,the management of listed companies are strategic in disclosing the advance notice of performance.They will choose between trading days and non-trading days,preferring to disclose good news in trading days and bad news in non-trading days;Second,from the market reaction after the disclosure of the choice of opportunity,it is found that the cumulative abnormal returns of the good news disclosed in the non-trading day are less,while the cumulative abnormal returns of the bad news disclosed in the non-trading day are significantly higher,which verifies the hypothesis of investors' limited attention,that is,the strategy of the listed company todisclose the performance forecast by the choice of opportunity has certain effect;Third,on the basis of the effectiveness of the satellite management strategy,compared with the other board secretary,satellite by CFO of board secretary disclosure unrael the stronger,they will tend to disclose good news on the trading day to attract investors pay close attention to expand the positive effect,and in the trading day disclosure of bad news,bad news to avoid the negative effect on company's share price.This paper enriches the board secretary and accounting information disclosure in the field of literature and research,to include the disclosure behavior of listed companies,the factors influencing results and provides new evidence that helps to understand information transfer mechanism of capital market and investors behavior,for corporate governance,and provides the beneficial reference for the decision-making investors,to strengthen the supervision of financial capital market,small and medium-sized investors protection legal interests is of great significance.