The Allocation Of Post-acquisition Control Rights,Legitimacy And M&A Performance

With more and more Chinese enterprises participating in cross-border M&A,on the one hand,it can promote enterprises to connect with the world,realize transformation and upgrading faster,and continuously enhance the international competitiveness of enterprises;on the other hand,enterprises will experience more setbacks and challenges,especially the reverse cross-border M&A of “weak M&A strong”,which makes enterprises face higher risk of failure.The signing of acquisition agreement only the first step has been taken.Post-acquisition integration is very important for the realization of the goal of cross-border M&A.The reasonable allocation of control right will affect the daily operation and sustainable development of the enterprise in the future.The reasonable allocation of control right can give full play to the competitive advantage of the enterprise,realize the coordination among the shareholders,the board of directors and the managers,and promote the enterprise to achieve the goal of M&A,so as to enhance the M&A value creation of enterprises.This research combines the control right theory,stakeholder theory and institutional theory to explore the mechanism of the influence of the control right allocation on the M&A performance.By constructing the research framework of the control right allocation,the internal legitimacy,the M&A mode and the M&A performance,this study explores the direct effect,mediation effect and moderating effect of control right allocation,internal legitimacy and M&A mode on M&A performance,and seeks the effective allocation mode of control post-acquisition of cross-border.Based on the survey data of China's 165 manufacturing enterprises that have initiated cross-border M&A,the results show that: the relationship between internal legitimacy and M&A performance is positive;the relevant assumptions of shareholder control allocation are not tenable;the relationship between the control of the board of directors and internal legitimacy and M&A performance is negative,and internal legitimacy plays a completely mediation effect between the control of the board of directors and M&A performance,but the moderating effect of M&A model is not significant;the relationship between managerial control and internal legitimacy and M&A performance is negative,and internal legitimacy plays a full mediation effect between managerial control and M&A performance,and M&A model plays a negative moderating effect between managerial control and internal legitimacy,that is,compared with the downward cross-border M&A,the upward cross-border M&A has a greater negative impact on the managerial control and internal legitimacy.This research takes the control rights allocation of post-acquisition as the breakthrough point,studies the cross-border M&A activities of Chinese enterprises from the perspective of stakeholders.The research results can not only enrich the existing M&A theories,but also provide theoretical guidance for Chinese enterprise managers to allocate the control right of the target enterprise,and provide theoretical basis for the formulation and optimization of relevant systems and policies of the cross-border M&A by the state.