Research On Pricing Strategy Of Logistics Platform Based On Two-sided Market Theory

In recent years,with the in-depth development of the Internet economy,a platform business model that facilitates supply and demand matching has emerged rapidly.This platform business model has been widely applied in communication,software development,vehicle and cargo matching,Shared travel,e-commerce,mobile payment,Internet finance,and other fields.A large number of platforms use the Internet technology to solve the supply and demand problem through efficient resource integration,create huge value for consumers and manufacturers while achieving profitability,which has led to the explosive growth of the platform economy and also formed a fierce competition.How to make good use of the characteristics of two-sided markets to formulate pricing strategies to ensure user participation,how to maintain the optimal state in cooperation,and how to formulate optimal strategies to achieve the optimal state of cooperation coordination are a hot topic for platform operators and scholars.First,in this thesis,the characteristics of two-sided markets and its influence,pricing strategy,as well as to the bilateral market platform for cooperation theory applied in the field of logistics and related literature analysis,and found that cross externalities between buyers and sellers is the most important characteristics of two-sided markets.Whether in the competition or in a cooperative scenario,platform decisions follow the basic principle is to use cross externalities to formulate pricing strategy to arouse the enthusiasm of platform users participation,and realize achieve the goal of maximizing profit ultimately.Then,this thesis studies three problems on this basis:(1)established a two-sided logistics platform model that strong intragroup externalities exist in service providers.Then studied the influence of intragroup externalities on platform pricing,platform profit and the proportion of profit contribution from different user groups;(2)Based on the joint membership mechanism,established a cooperation model of two cross-industry two-sided platforms that the cooperative offer is the leader of the Stackelberg game.Then given the negotiable space of revenue sharing and mainly studied the relationship between revenue sharing with platform pricing,user participation,and platform profits;(3)Established a cooperation model that considering the differences between cooperation platforms which the cooperative offer is the follower of the Stackelberg game.The optimal state of cooperation is obtained through the comparison of decentralized and centralized decisions and then based on the number of users participating in the optimal cooperation in the optimal cooperation state,set up the two-part pricing coordination mechanism.Within the coordination mechanism,the profits obtained by participating platforms are achieved pareto improvement compared to decentralized decision-making,a win-win situation for two-sided platform joint membership cooperation can be achieved.Different from the previous research that focuses more on platform competition,this thesis starts with the pricing strategy of a single platform and focuses on the cooperation of the platform.The conclusion has certain significance for the platform on how to price,how to balance profit and user participation,especially for the platform that provides logistics matching between service supply and demand.This thesis also provides a reference for how logistics service platforms can carry out cross-industry cooperation,and how to solve the coordination problems of co-operation through pricing strategies to achieve a win-win situation.