Research On The Impact Of Bank-enterprise Association On Inefficient Investment Of Enterprises

As a crucial input factor,capital plays an increasingly important role in promoting economic growth.The higher the efficiency of capital allocation,the stronger the impetus to economic growth.How to improve the efficiency of capital allocation has become a key issue in the stage of high-quality development of China's economy.As China's current financial mechanism and legal system are still not sound enough,there are generally alternative financial channels and corporate governance mechanisms with relationship and reputation mechanism as the core.Companies and Banks can be directly linked through cross-shareholdings and indirectly through the hiring of former bank executives.From the perspective of the manufacturing enterprise executives shareholding associated or related companies must be associated with the bank mean to establish effective channels of financing constraints,and the fact whether associated with abundant funds to get effective use,not only relates to bank credit capital allocation efficiency,and is related to the investment efficiency of the enterprise itself and the value of the company.On the basis of combing and summarizing the existing literature,this paper USES the method of theoretical hypothesis and empirical analysis,constructs mathematical model and conducts OLS regression analysis to reveal the relationship between bank-enterprise correlation and the inefficient investment of enterprises,and further analyzes the specific influence of bank-enterprise correlation on the under-investment and over-investment.In this paper,the bank-enterprise association,an external governance mechanism,is incorporated into the influence framework of enterprise investment efficiency,which expands the research scope of investment efficiency and provides ideas for reference on how to promote the innovation of Chinese manufacturing enterprises from the perspective of external governance.Through the research of this paper,the following conclusions are drawn: first,the bank-enterprise relationship can effectively alleviate the underinvestment of enterprises,and at the same time send a positive signal to the capital market,so that enterprises can obtain cheaper,convenient and quick financial support from financial institutions;At the same time,after the establishment of a relationship between manufacturing enterprises and Banks,financial institutions represented by Banks will restrain the excessive investment of enterprises according to the research and prediction of future market development,so as to make the investment of enterprisesreturn to rationality.Second,the inhibition effect of bank-enterprise correlation on inefficient investment is mainly concentrated at the level of non-state-owned enterprises.The financial risk control resources of non-state-owned enterprises are more insufficient,and the establishment of bank-enterprise relationship can greatly improve their risk control ability,so that their excessive investment is restrained.At the same time,non-state-owned enterprises are more likely to be restricted by "revolving door" and "spring door" in the financing process,and bank-enterprise relationship can also play an important role in the process of easing financing constraints.Thirdly,the influence of bank-enterprise association on inefficient investment varies in different regions with different marketization degrees.For under-investment,bank-enterprise association mainly focuses on regions with low degree of marketization.Therefore,enterprises in regions with low degree of marketization establish bank-enterprise association mainly for the purpose of easing financing constraints,so it plays a better role in alleviating under-investment.