Research On Task-oriented Incentive Mechanism Of Virtual Enterprise

Since the 21 st century,human society has gradually entered the era of knowledge economy with the process of economic globalization.The acceleration of globalization and the rapid development of information technology have intensified the fierce competition in the market.More and more companies realize that it is difficult to grasp diversified user needs and fleeting market opportunities with their own resources.A taskoriented,effective means of optimizing and integrating the core capabilities and resources of enterprises-Virtual Enterprise(Virtual Enterprise,VE)has become a practical choice for more and more enterprises.Reasonable and effective incentive mechanism is the key to determine the success of the virtual enterprise.Therefore,this paper takes the virtual enterprise as the research background and studies the task-oriented incentive mechanism of the virtual enterprise.The main research work is as follows:(1)Based on the principal-agent theory and multi-objective optimization model,the incentive mechanism of virtual enterprise considering task allocation is studied.First,in order to reduce the moral hazard caused by the “free ride” behavior of member companies,a virtual enterprise task incentive contract that introduces a supervision mechanism is designed based on the principal-agent theory.Through the solution analysis of the contract model,the effectiveness of the supervision mechanism in restraining the “free rider” behavior is demonstrated.Then,based on the above incentive design,the task assignment problem in virtual enterprise environment is studied,and a multi-task assignment model with total profit,task execution cost and time as optimization goals is proposed.Finally,the model is solved through numerical examples,and the impact of the supervision intensity of core enterprises and the degree of risk avoidance of members on task allocation is explored on the basis of the contract model.Some guidance suggestions are provided for the task allocation scheme of virtual enterprises.(2)Based on the principal-agent theory and the two-stage dynamic game,a virtual enterprise incentive mechanism is established that considers the importance of tasks and the "ratchet effect".First,based on the principal-agent model,design a virtual enterprise incentive contract that considers the importance of the task,solve the optimal incentive strength of the core company and the optimal effort level of the member companies about the importance of the task through the first-order condition method,and analyzes the influence of task importance on incentive contract.Some countermeasures and suggestions are provided for task management of the virtual enterprise.Then,in view of the common "ratchet effect" phenomenon in multi-period tasks,a two-stage dynamic game model was established to analyze the cause of the "ratchet effect" phenomenon.And from the three aspects of reducing information asymmetry,introducing invisible incentives and linking past output,some incentive strategies for core enterprises to suppress "ratchet effect" are proposed.