Corporate Social Responsibility, Executive Compensation And Investment

There is a rational consensus in the economics field,that is,the macro-micro subject is bound to take into account efficiency and fairness at the same time of economic development.Under the current background of the times,state-owned enterprises shoulder the important role of national efficiency and fair regulation..At the same time of good development of national economic,the concept of fairness requires state-owned enterprises to put more attention into corporate social responsibility.When state-owned enterprises carry out capital investment,they need to spend a large amount of state-owned capital of financial.This will squeeze out the social responsibility expenses to a certain extent.However,due to the social necessity of state-owned enterprise social responsibility,state-owned enterprises must reduce their capital investment.Therefore,the implementation of state-owned enterprise social responsibility can reduce the amount of non-efficiency investment to a certain extent,and realize the optimization and long-term development of state-owned capital.Most of the existing literature focuses on how the financial indicators and political factors of state-owned enterprises affect the investment decisions,and only considers the investment decisions from a financial perspective,which makes the perfect path of the problem of state-owned capital inefficient investment always difficult to draw.Incorporating social responsibility into the scope of business operations is conducive to better formulating a reasonable and effective social responsibility implementation mechanism,which is conducive to the long-term development of state-owned enterprises and state-owned capital.At the same time,the existing literature in the study of the impact of corporate social responsibility on the scale of investment,neglecting the important decision-making control role of management at the corporate governance level,this paper incorporates executive compensation into the research framework,enriching the study of social responsibility and investment scale.This study selects the sample data of A-share listed state-owned enterprises from2012 to 2016,and carries out regression verification on the basic of hypothesis proposed in this paper.It is concluded that the implementation of state-owned enterprise social responsibility is significantly negatively correlated with the scale of enterprise investment;the state-owned enterprise executive compensation and enterprise investment scale is significantly negatively correlated;executive compensation can strengthen the negative relationship between corporate social responsibility and investment scale.The results show that the higher the salary of executives,the positive incentive effect that enterprises can fulfill their social responsibilities,and the good executive compensation level can promote the incentive effect to play better.Based on this conclusion,the following suggestions are proposed: forming an endogenous mechanism for social responsibility of state-owned enterprises;improving the external incentive mechanism for social responsibility of state-owned enterprises;improving the executive compensation system of state-owned enterprises in China;and strengthening the management mechanism for investment decisions of state-owned enterprises.