Research On The Motivation Of Capital Occupation Of Listed Companies' Major Shareholders And Its Economic Consequences

In recent years,the phenomenon of large shareholder's capital occupation in China's capital market is endless.The major shareholders' occupation of funds is usually for the purpose of seeking control rights,relieving their own debt crisis and financing pressure.There are many ways for major shareholders to misappropriate the funds of listed companies,such as illegal guarantee,joint borrowing,direct lending and asset transfer through related transactions.Due to the hidden and complex means,it is difficult for the relevant regulatory authorities to review the work.These violations not only damage the interests of listed companies,but also cause losses to creditors and small and medium-sized investors,and hinder the sound development of the capital market.Therefore,it is urgent to completely solve the problem of large shareholders occupying the funds of listed companies.From April 2017 to August 2019,the major shareholders of Gaosheng holding embezzled the interests of the listed company in various ways,with a total amount of2.9 billion yuan.In this paper,Gao Sheng holding is selected as the research object,and the research method of case analysis is used to make an in-depth study on the case of capital occupation of Wei Zhenyu,the actual controller,by using the absolute holding position.The specific contents are as follows: the first chapter is the introduction.It mainly introduces the research background,research significance,research methods and literature at home and abroad.The second chapter is the theoretical overview of large shareholders' fund occupation,which provides the theoretical basis for the following case analysis.The third chapter is the case of Gao Sheng's major shareholder's fund occupation.To sort out the capital behavior of Gaosheng holding,pave the way for the following case analysis.The fourth chapter is the research on the reason of the capital occupation of Gaosheng controlling shareholders.The fifth chapter is the economic consequences brought by the capital occupation of Gaosheng controlling shareholders.The sixth chapter is to propose countermeasures and suggestions for the problem of large shareholders' fund occupation.Through the study of this case,this paper finds that the influencing factors of Gao Sheng's major shareholders' fund occupation are divided into internal and external reasons.The internal reason is that the ownership structure is too centralizedand the internal governance and control are defective.The external reasons are mainly the lack of continuity of law enforcement by CSRC,the low cost of major shareholders' violation of rules and regulations,and the lack of supervision role of intermediary institutions.The capital occupation of Gaosheng's major shareholders has seriously affected the company's operation,damaged the interests of small and medium-sized investors and corporate image.In this regard,this paper believes that we can prevent the large shareholders' occupation of funds from internal governance and external supervision.As far as the internal governance of the company is concerned,the superior company should optimize the structure of equity checks and balances,expand the voice of small and medium shareholders in the decision-making level of the company,and give full play to the supervision role of independent directors.In terms of external supervision,regulators should regulate the information disclosure of listed companies,improve the continuity of law enforcement,and increase the cost of violations;independent audit institutions should play their role of supervision and regulation,standardize business operation procedures,and effectively protect the rights and interests of small and medium-sized shareholders.The author hopes that through the case study of Gao Sheng's major shareholders' fund occupation,it can provide a practical reference for the capital market to solve the major shareholders' fund occupation.