Research On The Impact Of High-tech Certification On Enterprise External Financing From The Perspective Of Information Superiority

In recent years,China has vigorously encouraged widest possible participation in entrepreneurial activities and innovation to promote economic transformation and upgrading.Financing constraints of high-tech enterprises have restricted their current development and become the bottleneck of their future development.The government starts to use innovation incentive policies to play an active role in the capital market.China formally implemented the high-tech enterprise identification policy in 2008,which is an important innovation strategy deployment with tax incentives as the policy tool.The guiding role of the government as a provider of supplementary information to investors in the capital market has attracted extensive attention,but so far,the academic circle has not reached a consensus on the effectiveness of innovation incentive policies,and the discussion on external financing channels has certain limitations.Different socio-economic background,different samples,different types of investors and different information environment would bring different research results.Based on the perspective of information advantage,this paper details credit financing to bank credit and commercial credit,discusses the heterogeneity of active institutional investors in the capital market,and analysis the signal transmission effect of high-tech certification on external financing under different information environment.Setting the research background in China,this paper takes signal transmission theory,Comparative advantage theory of financing and information asymmetry theory as the theoretical support to explore the relationship between high-tech certification and heterogeneous external financing of enterprises.The research results of this paper show that the characteristics of investors lead to their different attitudes towards high-tech certification.Commercial credit and non-independent institutional investors fail to show a positive attitude towards the government's recognition signals of high-tech enterprises due to their information advantages,while bank credit and independent institutional investors take high-tech certification as an important reference for issuing loans and increasing investment to enterprises.After introducing the quality index of enterprise information disclosure,it is found that the transparency of listed companies can weaken the positive influence of high-tech certification on credit financing and independent institutional investors,and even cause grey institutional investors to reduce their hold.The conclusion of this paper demonstrates the signal effect of high-tech certification on external financing,which is beneficial to alleviate the information asymmetry between enterprises and investors.The signal transmission theory under the framework of government innovation policy research related to the economic consequences is a beneficial supplement,but also expanded the research about government innovation policy effectiveness evaluation,also enriched the bank credit,commercial credit,heterogeneity of institutional investors holding decision-making research literature,deepened the understanding of China's capital market.This article for future management practice provides a rich theoretical analysis and empirical evidence,and the role of the government's policy is not only beneficial to enterprise managers,management strategy has important reference value to the enterprise,to implement the policy of the government innovation incentives and reasonable guide investment behavior of institutional investors,stabilize the market also has a positive meaning.