| In the process of comprehensively deepening the reform of state-owned enterprises,the promotion of modern enterprise system has become the most basic requirement.However,the corporate system advocated by modern enterprises has a natural governance defect,that is,the gradual separation of ownership and management rights of modern enterprises that implement the corporate system,resulting in the collision,contradiction and even opposition of interests between the owners and managers of the company.Managers,as economic people,may sometimes sacrifice the interests of the company in order to get more personal rewards.At the same time,managers have richer,more timely and more complete information,but they often reserve information in the face of owners,which further aggravates the information asymmetry between owners and managers.When management directly or indirectly damages the interests of the company,the owner is not aware of it.Therefore,a reasonable,binding and incentive manager compensation contract plays a key role in solving the above problems.In recent years,the management level of some state-owned enterprises is enjoying a higher administrative level while receiving a "sky-high salary" that far exceeds the average level of the industry,which has aroused heated discussion in the society.The party central committee attaches great importance to this,and will gradually improve the state-owned enterprises distribution system as a requirement and direction of deepening the reform of state-owned enterprises.At the same time,the distribution system of state-owned enterprises has become a hot topic in the theoretical circle.In this paper,based on the normative research,through to the domestic and foreign scholars about the executive compensation and corporate performance correlation and other factors affecting the executive compensation research achievements on carding,analysis and grasp,put forward the corresponding research hypothesis,combined with the empirical approach,selecting the 2017,deep in Shanghai a-share listing of state-owned listed company in jiangsu foreign public disclosure of the annual report data as sample,the sample data are arranged,screening,classification,sorting and summary,and has carried on the descriptive statistical analysis using the statistical software SPSS22.0,This paper describes the executive compensation situation of state-owned holding listed companies in jiangsu,zhejiang and Shanghai in 2017 from two aspects of the overall situation and the scale of assets.Constructed on the basis of the univariate and multivariate linear regression model,on executive pay and performance on behalf of the company's basic earnings per share,two indexes weighted average return on equity,and the company size,and other four factors affecting the relationship between the correlation analysis and regression analysis,then summarizes the jiangsu region state holding listed companies the influence of firm performance on executive pay.After a series of empirical analysis,this paper draws the following conclusions: the executive compensation of state-owned listed companies in jiangsu,zhejiang and Shanghai region is significantly positively correlated with the company's performance and size,but has no significant relationship with the financial leverage,the proportion of independent directors and the integration of chairman and general manager.In this regard,this paper puts forward the following five Suggestions: on the premise of closely linking executive compensation with company performance,to prevent fraud;Set the proportion of the company's scale in the salary assessment;Give full play to the role of independent directors and improve the system of independent directors;We will strengthen restrictions on the assets and liabilities of state-owned enterprises.The combination of the chairman and general manager should be classified and evaluated objectively and equity incentive should be given appropriately. |
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