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The Research On The Relationship Between Executive Incentive And Enterprise Growth In Mixed Reform State-Owned Enterprises

Posted on:2021-01-30Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:X Y YuFull Text:PDF
GTID:2439330620965533Subject:Enterprise management
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
According to the theory of endogenous growth of enterprises,compared with the external factors,the internal factors play a more important role in the growth of enterprises,especially in the dynamic role of management ability in the expansion of enterprises.Therefore,the research focus of enterprise growth should be on the internal governance.According to the innovation theory,the sustainable development ability of an enterprise comes from technological innovation.For modern enterprises,under the background of the rapid development of global scientific and technological revolution and the accelerated transformation of economic development mode,the competition among companies is no longer just relying on the resource market to win,but more to the competition of innovation ability and strength marked by innovation.As the most important human capital of an enterprise,executives are the decision-makers of the enterprise's business strategy and innovation behavior.Therefore,it is of great practical significance for the enterprise to organize the senior management team to maximize its innovation potential and to clarify the role of senior management behavior in the long-term development of the enterprise.Since the Third Plenary Session of the 18 th CPC Central Committee,the implementation of mixed ownership reform has become the focus of deepening the reform of state-owned enterprises in the new situation.During 2013-2018,provinces(districts and cities)have clearly implemented more than 5000 "mixed reform" enterprises,including the introduction of non-state-owned capital of 600 billion yuan;while the central enterprises have implemented 3359 "mixed reform" and introduced nonpublic capital of 900 billion yuan.In 2019,the pace of "mixed reform" will be further accelerated.Only from January to September,more than 600 enterprises of mixed ownership will be added at all levels of central enterprises.At present,the proportion of mixed reform of central enterprises has reached 70%,and the fourth batch of "mixed reform" pilot list has also been reviewed and approved.With the deepening of "mixed reform" and the introduction of relevant policy documents,how to realize the growth and development of "mixed reform" stateowned enterprises has become a hot spot and focus to be solved.For the "mixed reform" stateowned enterprises,it naturally has its complex multi principal-agent characteristics and the multi equity mechanism formed after the introduction of heterogeneous capital.Under various special backgrounds,whether the original incentive measures given in the process of corporate governance can still achieve the expected incentive effect,and then promote the growth of "mixed reform" state-owned enterprises? What kind of action path will be formed when the equity balance degree is in it? In view of this,based on the relevant literature review,combined with the principal-agent theory,corporate growth theory,this paper analyzes the relationship between executive incentive and corporate growth.Then take the panel data of "mixed reform" state-owned enterprises in 2013-2017 as the research sample,put the relationship between executive incentive and corporate growth in the special situation of "mixed reform" state-owned enterprises,and empirically explore the effectiveness of executive incentive and the influence trend of executive incentive on corporate growth under the influence of equity checks and balances,and introduce innovation investment as an intermediary variable to explore the impact of executive incentive on corporate growth The specific role path of enterprise growth.The results show that:(1)executive compensation incentive and equity incentive have positive effects on the growth of state-owned enterprises.(2)R & D investment plays a part of intermediary role between executive incentive and corporate growth in "mixed reform" stateowned enterprises.It can realize the positive role of executive incentive in corporate growth through R & D investment.(3)The degree of equity balance has a positive regulatory role between executive compensation incentive and R & D investment level in "mixed reform" stateowned enterprises.
Keywords/Search Tags:mixed reform of state-owned enterprises, executive incentive, technological innovation, enterprise growth, equity balance
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