The Study On Balance Of Non-State Shareholders And Economic Performance Of State-Owned Enterprises' Mixed-Ownership Reform

Under the "new normal" of China's economy,the mixed-ownership reform is an effective way and inevitable choice to enhance the vitality,creativity and influence of the state-owned enterprises(SOEs).The key of mixed-ownership reform is to achieve joint development and effective power balance between different ownership capitals.The existing research mainly focuses on the evaluation of the effect of mixed-ownership reform and equity structure of SOEs,but the role of non-state capital in the mixed-ownership reform has been overlooked.Different from existing literature,this paper originally takes the perspective of non-state shareholders to explore the influence of balance of non-state shareholders on the economic performance of SOEs' mixed-ownership reform,and further considers the restraint effect of external environment on the power balance of non-state shareholders.This paper has important practical significance for solving the dilemma faced by the reform of SOEs,clarifying the path and direction of further reform,and realizing the breakthrough of mixed-ownership reform.At the same time,it provides new ideas and evidence for theoretical research framework and empirical research.In view of the lack of theoretical research on the mixed-ownership reform of SOEs,this paper builds a enterprise evolution theoretical framework for the mixed-ownership reform of SOEs.Based on the new perspective of enterprise evolution theory,this paper summarizes the evolution process of China's SOEs reform,and thus clarifies the core driving role of mixed-ownership reform in the development of SOEs.This paper assumes that the essence of the mixed-ownership reform of SOEs is to hybrid cross the genes of SOEs and the genes of non-state-owned enterprises to form a better enterprise gene,just like the genetic engineering of enterprises.Different from biological genetic engineering,it is difficult to ensure the equal status of two mixed subjects in the process of mixed-ownership reform of SOEs,but the realization of balance of non-state shareholders is the premise and basis for making non-state genes play their due role.In addition,according to the environmental selection mechanism of enterprise evolution,balance of non-state shareholders will be constrained by the external environment.Based on the perspective of non-state shareholders,this paper uses the data of commercial first-class local state-owned listed companies as samples to explore the influence of balance of non-state shareholders on SOEs economic performance of mixed-ownership reform.On the theoretical aspect,we introduce the collusion of the state-owned controlling shareholder and manager into the linear contract principal-agent framework,and respectively solve the principal-agent problem under the condition of nominal equity diversification and balance of non-state shareholders.The results show that balance of non-state shareholders can effectively reduce the dual agency cost of state-owned listed enterprises.The economic effect of balance of non-state shareholder is obviously better than the case of nominal equity diversification where non-state shareholders only reduce the first agency cost by making the optimal incentive contract by state controlling shareholders.In terms of empirical research,the systematic GMM method is used to empirically test the influence of balance of non-state shareholders on SOEs economic performance.The results show that balance of non-state shareholders can significantly improve the economic performance of state-owned listed enterprises.The results of replacement of economic performance indicators and the substitution of balance of non-state shareholders indicators prove that the conclusions are robust and reliable.The heterogeneity tests of regional groups show that the promotion effect of balance of non-state shareholders on SOEs economic performance is affected by external environments.Furthermore,this paper tests the threshold effect of balance of non-state shareholders and finds that the threshold effect of balance of non-state-owned shareholders on SOEs economic performance is very obvious.Only when the balance of non-state shareholders exceeds a certain threshold value can it promote SOEs economic performance.Finally,the mechanism tests show that balance of non-state shareholders can improve SOEs economic performance through reducing two types of principal-agent costs and policy burdens.Next,this paper considers the restraining effect of external environment on balance of non-state-owned shareholders.In terms of theoretical model,we analyze the influence of competitive environment and institutional environment on mixed-ownership reform of SOEs by constructing an oligarchic competition model.In terms of empirical research,we build hierarchical linear models by using enterprise-level data,industry-level data and regional-level data at same time to empirically inspect the impact industry competition environment and the institutional environment on balance of non-state shareholders.It comes to conclusions as follows:Enterprise efficiency is not an ex-ante characteristic needed to satisfy of balance of non-state shareholders;The degree of industry competition is not the main factor affecting balance of non-state shareholders,but the empirical researches are limited by the samples.The more competitive the environment,the more non-state investors value the competitive advantage of SOEs;Local government intervention will prevent balance of non-state shareholders.In the areas where local government intervention is strong,balance of non-state shareholders tends to be lower,suggesting that the mixed-ownership reform of SOEs does not follow the market mechanism but is more like a rescue restructuring for inefficient SOEs.In areas where government functions transform more thoroughly,the mixed-ownership reform can follow the market mechanism.Finally,this paper further examines the regulatory effect of institutional environment on the SOEs economic performance,and finds that local government intervention indirectly exerts a reduction on SOEs economic performance through balance of non-state shareholders.