Research On The Relationship Between The Pledge Of Major Shareholders' Equity And Investment Efficiency

In recent years,the major shareholders of listed companies carry out equity pledge business more and more frequently,and the financial risks brought by the major shareholders' equity pledge cannot be underestimated.Based on the practice of equity pledge business in capital market,this paper analyzes the impact of equity pledge of many major shareholders on the investment efficiency of listed companies,and warns regulators and investors to effectively control the systemic financial risks and investment risks brought by equity pledge.This paper studies the relationship between equity pledge and investment efficiency of multiple large shareholders by constructing econometric model,and focuses on the role of external governance environment and internal governance mechanism in the relationship between equity pledge and investment efficiency of large shareholders,so as to achieve the goal of providing policy suggestions for regulators and investors.It is found that the major shareholders' equity pledge aggravates the degree of inefficient investment of listed companies,which is manifested in the over investment and under investment.The short-term overinvestment caused by the equity pledge is the illusion created by the major shareholders to maintain the stock price.The long-term under investment caused by the equity pledge reflects the essential purpose of the major shareholders to encroach on the interests of the company.At the same time,good external governance environment and effective internal governance mechanism are conducive to alleviate the negative impact of large shareholder equity pledge on investment efficiency;further research shows that large shareholder equity pledge plays a part of intermediary effect on enterprise investment efficiency through the first kind of agency cost,and the external creditors demand higher debt return rate,which is helpful to restrain the degree of inefficient investment and over investment.In theory,this paper creatively analyzes the impact of large shareholders' equity pledge on the efficiency of enterprise investment from the perspective of external governance environment and internal governance mechanism,and for the first time explains the causes of inefficient investment of listed companies from the perspective of multiple large shareholders' equity pledge behavior.The research of this paper is beneficial to standardize the behavior of stock pledge of major shareholders of listed companies,improve the transparency and quality of stock pledge information disclosure of listed companies,safeguard the legitimate rights and interests of investors,and provide policy suggestions for regulators to implement effective supervision of stock pledge.