Research On Local Government Competition,Public Expenditure Bias And Urban-rural Income Gap

According to China Statistical Yearbook data,from 1978 to 2018,China's urban-rural per capita disposable income ratio has been maintained at a relatively high position.If bonuses,benefits and practical subsidies are included in the calculation,the actual urban-rural income gap will be greater.The Nineteenth National Congress emphasized that the government plays a leading role in improving people's livelihood.It should optimize the structure of public expenditure,improve people's livelihood,and resolve various "unbalanced and insufficient" problems in the social development of the new era.At present,the competition behavior of local governments in our country has evolved to pay more attention to the use of public goods and public services in the means of expenditure competition,which is easy to cause expenditure bias.In order to attract foreign capital inflows to stimulate economic growth in the region,on the one hand,excessive emphasis has been placed on technological innovation and infrastructure construction,resulting in economic expenditure bias;on the other hand,with the central government's emphasis on people's livelihood construction,only GDP growth rate is the core The official appraisal mechanism has become unitary,and human capital has become an important potential for regional development.Local governments are gradually attaching importance to public services such as education,medical care,and social security,which may also lead to service expenditure bias.Under this background,clarifying the relationship between local government competition and public expenditure bias on the income gap between urban and rural residents helps to deeply analyze the impact of local governments ' expenditure policies on the urban-rural income gap in the context of local government competition.The impact,to a certain extent,enriches and supplements the limitations of existing research,and provides a new research perspective and research method for studying the impact mechanism of the urban-rural income gap in China.This article selects local government competition,public expenditure bias and urban-rural income gap as the research objects,constructs a theoretical framework among the three,and theoretically analyzes the impact of local government competition on public expenditure bias and the impact of public expenditure bias on urban-rural income gap.Inner mechanism.This article uses a spatial econometricmodel to empirically analyze the impact of local government competition on the financial expenditure bias and service expenditure bias of people's livelihood finance,the impact of public expenditure bias on regional urban-rural income gap,and the interaction between local government competition and public expenditure bias The impact on the urban-rural income gap.Based on the above theoretical analysis and empirical results,the corresponding policy recommendations are put forward.The study found that: 1.Local government competition directly expands the economic expenditure bias,but it will not suppress the service expenditure bias.Instead,it will increase the proportion of service expenditure in regional strategic interactions.What really suppresses the proportion of service expenditure is fiscal decentralization factor.2.Economic expenditure bias and service expenditure bias significantly widen the urban-rural income gap,confirming that the local government's public expenditure is significantly tilted towards the city,leading to the widening of the urban-rural income gap.3.Local government competition affects the urban-rural income gap through public expenditure bias.The partial interaction between local government competition and economic expenditure will lead to a further expansion of the urban-rural income gap;however,there is benign interaction between local government competition and service expenditure bias,which has the effect of reducing the urban-rural income gap.Based on the conclusions,I put forward four policy suggestions: Innovating the performance evaluation system to regulate local government competition behavior;starting from the precise rural public service supply,improving the efficiency of fund use;optimizing economic expenditures to achieve coordinated development of urban and rural areas;Improve the financial system,optimize the function and structure of financial expenditure;Reform and innovate the urbanization construction model.