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Competition For Control Rights Under Tunneling Motivation

Posted on:2020-08-03Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:Z Q YaoFull Text:PDF
GTID:2439330623950303Subject:Accounting
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
In the context of rapid development of China's market economy,more and more cases of competition for control rights occur in listed companies.Among them,the competition for control rights dominated by PBC infringes on the interests of minority shareholders and is extremely harmful to corporate value and capital market.Tunneling behavior of major shareholders of listed companies is caused by the unbalanced allocation of resources through the instruction of control rights.Uneven allocation of corporate control rights to resources leads to instability of corporate control rights and competition for control rights.Meanwhile,a large number of empirical studies prove that the competition for control rights plays a positive role in reducing agency costs and improving corporate governance structure.Therefore,it is helpful to explore more effective corporate governance to study the competition for control rights under tunneling motivation.Based on the case of "the battle for control rights" of yeah-info company,which is known as the "first case of rights protection for minority shareholders",this paper studies the influence of the battle for control rights between the interest representatives of two parties on corporate governance under the tunneling motivation of large shareholders' infringement on the rights and interests of minority shareholders.Based on the analysis of control returns empty theory,motivation theory and based on the company,on the basis of controlled area according to the theory of governance,from the control for the drivers,path,and the result in time dynamic order point combing and analysis of the case,summarized about control configuration,equity structure optimization,the board of directors the path and method of system construction and shareholders interests protection.This paper argues that the tunneling of major shareholders is inhibited by the competition for control rights under tunneling motivation.With the continuous development of market economy,China's capital market is becoming more and more mature,and the consciousness of active rights protection of minority shareholders will gradually become an effective means to protect the interests of minority shareholders.
Keywords/Search Tags:Tunneling, Minority shareholders' rights and interests, Struggle for control
PDF Full Text Request
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