Research On Tunneling Behavior Of Major Shareholders Of H Company

Although the company law passed by China in 1993 and the securities law passed by China in 1998 have been amended for many times,the regulatory mechanism for tunneling is still not sound and the punishment is not strong en ough to create a deterrent effect.H company,as a star enterprise of backdoor listing,has a peak market value of more than 70 billion yuan.However,after being investigated by China securities regulatory commission in 2017,it was fo und to be heavily in debt and riddled with holes,which can be regarded as th e representative of major shareholders hollowing out listed companies in recent years.Through a detailed analysis of the ways,causes and economic conseque nces of tunneling behavior of major shareholders in H company,this paper put s forward useful suggestions on how to prevent tunneling behavior of major sh areholders and protect the legitimate rights and interests of small and medium-s ized investors.Based on the theory of control right,principal-agent theory and corporate governance theory,this paper analyzes the motivation,conditions and governanc e of the tunneling behavior of major shareholders one by one.Secondly,introd uce the basic situation of H company and the procedure of the hollowed event s,focus on analysis of large shareholder structure adopted by the false agreem ent backdoor listings,large amount of receivables and advance payment transact ions,excessive foreign investment as well as the illegal guarantee empty four ways and its harm,from internal governance,medium and small investors' right s consciousness hollowed behavior,external supervision,illegal cost four aspec ts in detail.In addition,this paper elaborates the economic consequences of tu nneling behavior of major shareholders on three dimensions: corporate operation, minority shareholders and capital market.Based on common financial indicator s,comparing enterprise industry,focus on analysis of hollowed behaviors befor e and after the operating enterprise,profitability,solvency and development of the four skills of dramatic changes,with basic earnings per share and stock pri ce,operating cash flow per share measure the value of small and medium-sized shareholders loss as well as the negative impact of the development of capital market.At last,it puts forward some suggestions to protect the major shareho lders of listed companies from tunneling and to promote the effective governan ce of tunneling behavior,so as to protect the interests of small and medium in vestors and provide references for the orderly and healthy development of liste d companies and the capital market.The possible innovation of this paper is that on the one hand,it increases the case study of tunneling behavior of major shareholders,which has certain theoretical significance.On the other hand,this paper puts forward some feasib le suggestions on preventing and governing tunneling behavior of major shareho lders,which is of practical significance for protecting the legitimate rights and interests of listed companies and small and medium-sized investors.