Research On The Influence Of Managerial Power On Corporate Investment Efficiency

In the context of the separation of the two powers of the enterprise,the management actually controls the power to allocate enterprise resources.The existence of problems such as proxy conflicts and information asymmetry between shareholders and management has made it possible for management to use the power of the hands to harm the efficiency of corporate investment.With the deepening of the reform of state-owned enterprises and the vigorous development of private enterprises,the power of enterprise management has also been concentrated and expanded to some extent.The fact that the state-owned enterprises have relatively concentrated shares and lack of ownership has greatly increased the possibility that state-owned enterprise management will abuse its powers for self-interest and will not hesitate to damage the efficiency of corporate investment.Among non-state-owned enterprises,it is common for founders or their family members to be senior managers of the company,which also provides a hotbed for the abuse of managerial authority.Based on the previous research,this paper defines management power as the actual possession of senior executives,which can make the decision-making result of the enterprise reach its expected influence.Starting from the incomplete contract theory,it is discussed that when other conditions are certain,the attribution of residual control rights is the root of the power of management.Further,combined with the previous research on the metrics of residual control rights and management power,the relevant indicators are selected and synthesized into integral variables to measure the power of the management of the enterprise.At the same time,the Richardson model is used to measure the level of corporate investment efficiency.Based on the information asymmetry and principal-agent theory,the relationship between management power and enterprise investment efficiency is analyzed.Then take the Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share manufacturing enterprises as the main research object,and select the data from 2001 to 2016 to empirically study the impact of corporate management power on investment efficiency.Furthermore,the sample is further divided into state-owned enterprises and non-state-owned enterprise groups according to the different ownership rights,and it is explored whether the influence of management power on investment efficiency differs under different property rights.Then add the internal control as a moderator to study whether internal control regulates the relationship between management power and corporate investment efficiency.The study found that management power and corporate investment efficiency have a significant negative impact.That is to say,with the expansion of management power,the overall investment efficiency of enterprises is declining.Moreover,when other conditions are certain,the management power of state-owned enterprises has a greater negative impact on the investment efficiency of enterprises than non-state-owned enterprises.After adding the internal control control variable,it is found that internal control can effectively reduce the negative relationship between management power and corporate investment efficiency.According to the research conclusions,this paper proposes relevant policy recommendations from the two levels of internal governance and external governance.In terms of internal governance,enterprises must improve the supervision mechanism of management power,and spare no effort to build a high-quality internal control system.At the same time,the effective flow and communication of information can be promoted by designing various mechanisms.In terms of external governance,this paper believes that it is very necessary to improve the manager market selection mechanism and introduce the reward and punishment mechanism for SOE investment.It also suggests that the government actively guide the media and play an external supervision role.