An Empirical Study Of The Enterprise’s Inefficient Investment By Managers

Recently,the inefficient investment of enterprises has been a hot issue discussed by many scholars,and it is also the focus of corporate governance.Under the background of separation of managerial right and ownership,investment decision-making is made by senior managers.According to the theory of management power,senior management team and owners are not the community of interests,and agency conflict is likely to occur,which leads to more serious economic consequences due to information asymmetry.Agency conflict creates opportunities for senior managers to abuse their power.The information asymmetry between owners and senior managers will lead to adverse selection and moral hazard,which leads to inefficient investment in enterprise（Zhongzhi Yan,2019）^[1].Therefore,how to make the top managers make effective investment decisions is studied by many scholars,and is also the fundamental goal of corporate governance.The existing research on how the executive power affects the inefficient investment of the enterprise is mainly from the perspective of the internal and external governance mechanism of the enterprise,and few scholars carry out research from the perspective of the TMT heterogeneity.In addition,before the upper echelons theory was put forward,the research on the executives of the enterprise was mainly based on the concept of homogeneity of the classical management theory,which believed that the executives of the enterprise were homogeneous,but in reality,the executives were heterogeneous（Guanju Chen,2019）^[2].The upper echelons theory points out that the background characteristics of senior management team members,such as environment,experience and experience,are not completely consistent,which makes the decision-making behavior of different senior management teams also different^[3].So,this dissertation plans to combine the heterogeneity of top executives,the power of top executives and the inefficient investment of enterprises,from the perspective of the heterogeneity of top executives,to study the influence of senior management power on the inefficient investment of enterprises,in order to enrich the relevant theoretical research and provide the corresponding practical reference for corporate governance.Based on the 2013-2017 public data of A-share Manufacturing Listed Companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen as the research sample,from the perspective of management power,according to the principal-agent theory,information asymmetry theory and upper echelons theory,I put the new investment and some factors that affect the new investment in the same regression model,calculate the residual through regression,measure the inefficient investment with the residual plus or minus,extract the main component of the index of the executive member as the director member,executive shareholding ratio and the salary of executive to calculate the comprehensive score to measure the executive power and select gender heterogeneity,age heterogeneity,education heterogeneity and time heterogeneity of senior management team as the TMT Heterogeneity to study the relationship between executive power and inefficient investment and the moderating effect of team heterogeneity on the relationship.The results show that the executive power is positively correlated with under investment,but not with over investment and the age heterogeneity of executive team has a positive regulatory effect on the positive correlation between executive power and under investment,but has no regulatory effect on the relationship between executive power and over investment;the gender,education and tenure heterogeneity of executive team have no regulatory effect on the relationship between executive power and inefficient investment.So,In order to improve the investment efficiency of manufacturing enterprises,we should improve the internal control deployment,rationalize executive power and strengthen the construction of executive team.