Venture Capital And Corporate Tax Avoidance

Successful public companies have made successful venture capital investments and gradually brought them into the public and academic view.For business operations,they can use industry experience to provide management advice and increase the market value of the business.As for corporate governance,they strengthened the supervision of the board of directors to managers as external investors.Therefore,it is of practical significance to examine the real impact of venture capital on start-ups.The existing literature on venture capital mainly focuses on three aspects: value-added,supervision and reputation.However,no literature has examined the interaction effect between different characteristics.On this issue,we believe that the corporate tax avoidance is not only related to the business activities of enterprises,but also related to corporate governance,which is conducive to linking the different characteristics of venture capital.Therefore,based on the above considerations,this paper attempts to study this issue from the perspective of corporate tax avoidance.Therefore,this paper took the data of listed companies on the National Equities Exchange and Quotations from 2012 to 2017 as samples to explore the impact of venture capital on the degree of tax avoidance of start-ups.It is found that there are collusion effect and supervision effect,but the collusion effect is stronger.Therefore,venture capital significantly increases the degree of corporate tax avoidance.High tax collection and management intensity and the nature of state-owned property rights strengthen the supervision effect,while reputation mechanism and partners' financial background strengthen the collusion effect.In addition,this paper also found that earnings management is its influence mechanism,IPO exit is its ultimate goal.The empirical results of this paper show the relationship between venture capital and the degree of corporate tax avoidance,indicating that venture capital plays a stronger role in corporate collusion than supervision,thus expanding the literature on the impact of venture capital on enterprises.