Research On Analyst Attention And Optimistic Earnings Forecast Based On The Reduction Of Executives

The reduction of listed company executives has been one of the major issues in the financial field after the completion of China's share-trading reform.It is generally believed that the company's executives as the main representative of insiders have an information advantage over ordinary investors.Analysts provide reasonable investment opinions for investors,but they generally have an optimistic tendency.The issue of independence has always been criticized by investors.Therefore,based on the background of executives' reduction,this paper conducts empirical research on analysts' concerns and analysts' optimistic earnings forecasts,confirming the relationship between some analysts and executives,and discovering The issue provides a number of reasonable policy recommendations.The full text is mainly analyzed and explored from two aspects:1.The reduction of executives of listed companies in the domestic capital market has always been considered to infringe the interests of small and medium shareholders to a certain extent.Based on the analysis of previous studies,this paper conducts a new system of executive reduction after the stock market crash.It was found that the analysts' attention before the reduction of executives will be significantly higher than that after the reduction,and the number of executives involved in the reduction will have a significant impact.Analyst attention before the reduction.2.Analysts,as information brokers in the capital market,have been reported to be optimistic and biased.Based on the background of executives' shareholding after the stock market crash and the private information content in the stock price,this paper explores the motives of optimistic earnings forecasts and finds the earnings forecast of analysts who release optimistic earnings forecasts before the executives reduce holdings.The amount of private information in the stock price will have a impact on the accuracy of earnings forecasts,proving that analysts may have incentives to cooperate with executives to reduce their holdings in exchange for private information.