Research On Influences Of Online Platform Entry And Comparison Of Cooperative Strategies Under O2O Background

With the rapid development of Chinese internet industry,there are more and more cooperations between online channels and offline channels.This online-to-offline cooperative model is called O2O(Online to Offline)mode,and the market size of Chinese O2 O has been showing an increasing trend since O2 O mode was proposed from 2011.However,in this cooperative model between online platform and offline store,there are also many problems that need to be explored,such as how the entry of online channels affects decisions from offline store,and if online channels enter,how they cooperate with offline stores,and how this different cooperative mode will have different effects on decisions from online and offline,etc.This thesis focused on the above issues.The specific contents are as follows:Firstly,considering the primary period of the development of O2 O business mode,based on the phenomenon of online platform taking advantage of the free-riding effects upon the service that provided by offline store,this thesis built the O2 O supply chain system structure consisting of online platform and offline store,considered the freeriding effect coefficient and subsidy strategy impacting the decision of channel pricing and profit,built the linear demand function through the relationship between price and market demand,and then determined the online and offline profit functions,used the Stackelberg game model to solve this model,analyzed the optimal pricing strategy of members in the O2 O channel supply chain under centralized and decentralized scenarios and the impact of free-riding effect and the subsidy strategy on channel profit.The main results: focused on the phenomenon online platform takes advantage of the free-riding effect upon service offline store provides,the online platform can increase the profits and price of two channels effectively by free-riding effect;Subsidy strategy can increase the price of online,however,decrease the profit of online platform and offline store.It means bonus mode can't improve the revenue both online and offline,only promote to cooperate with each other.Secondly,this thesis studied the contract designed problem of cooperative mode between online and offline considering consumer heterogeneity under O2 O background.This thesis considered two elements impacting the selection of channel for customers including inconvenience cost and product valuation,then it built a utility function based on product valuation,inconvenience cost and the preference to online for consumer.Two contracts under the O2 O operation mode were designed: the percentage margin strategy and the wholesale price strategy,and the online and offline profit functions were built and solved by the Stackelberg game model.Through numerical experiments,the results:(1)the whole demand and profit all increase,offline demand decreases and offline profit may increase or decrease;(2)the price,demand and profit of online platform all increase as the acceptance to online increases.Especially,results show the preference of choice on strategy is associated with product valuation.Moreover,the choice is also related to acceptance to online and percentage margin in the same condition.