Executive Shareholding,R&D Investment,and M&A Performance

In the context of economic structural adjustment and transformation and upgrading,mergers and acquisitions have become an important means for China’s listed companies to optimize resource allocation and achieve industrial upgrading.According to the Wind M & A database,in 2018,China completed a total of 2584 M & A transactions with a transaction value of 1,265.3 billion yuan.Among them,the information technology industry has become a hot spot for M & A transactions,and the number of M & A transactions ranks first in the industry.At the same time,in order to solve the principalagent problem caused by the "separation of two powers",listed companies have implemented executive equity incentive mechanisms.For listed companies in the information technology industry with technology at the core,on the one hand,the implementation of executive equity incentives can reduce agency conflicts,which is conducive to post-merger management integration and the improvement of merger and acquisition performance;on the other hand,executive shareholding will also Influence the company’s R & D investment by influencing management’s innovation investment decisions,and then affect the company’s long-term performance.Therefore,exploring the mechanism between the information technology industry’s executive shareholding,R & D investment and M & A performance is of great significance to further improve the equity incentive system of listed companies,adhere to the innovation-driven development strategy,and improve the quality of mergers and acquisitions of listed companies.This article first systematically combed the relevant literature on the relationship between executive shareholding,R & D investment and M & A performance.It was found that the existing literature research mainly focused on the two,and the research on the relationship between the three was mostly analyzed from the corporate performance level.,lack of a more detailed exploration of the mechanism between the three from the perspective of M & A performance.Therefore,this paper conducts an empirical analysis of the relationship between executive holdings and M & A performance based on principal-agent theory and incentive theory,and adds R & D investment as an intermediary variable to study the specific mechanism between executive holdings,R & D investment and M & A performance.This article selects 109 listed companies in the Shanghai-Shenzhen A-share software and information technology service industry that have undergone mergers and acquisitions between 2013 and 2017 as research samples,and uses event research and accounting index methods to build short-term and long-term M & A performance evaluation models,using multiple regression Analyze the empirical research on the relationship between executive shareholding and short-term M & A performance and long-term M & A performance.On the basis of verifying that there is a link between executive shareholding and long-term M & A performance,it is further tested whether R & D investment acts as a mediating variable between the two.Finally,the research hypothesis in this paper is further verified by a robust test.Based on theoretical and empirical analysis,this article draws the following conclusions:(1)For listed companies in China’s A-share software and information technology services industry,executive holdings have no significant impact on short-term M & A performance,but in the long run,both from a market perspective and from a financial perspective.The increase in the shareholding of executives has significantly increased the long-term M & A performance of the acquirer company;It has a significant promotion effect on corporate R & D investment;(3)R & D investment has played an intermediary role in the relationship between executive holdings and M & A performance.The impact of executive holdings on long-term M & A performance is transmitted to some extent through R & D investment.Based on the relevant theoretical analysis and empirical research results,this article puts forward relevant suggestions from the corporate level and the government level:(1)For listed companies,first,improve the equity incentive system,and especially attach importance to the equity incentives for company executives.;second,attach importance to R & D investment and accelerate collaborative innovation;third,strengthen effective supervision and optimize the company’s internal governance mechanism;fourth,strengthen corporate finance Management and regular information disclosure;(2)For government departments,first,the government should actively guide and support hightech enterprises in M & A and reorganization,simplify the merger and acquisition reporting and approval procedures,and establish an effective regulatory mechanism for mergers and acquisitions.;second,adhere to the innovation development strategy,increase support for corporate innovation activities,and encourage enterprises to increase investment in research and development through tax and fee reductions;fourth,strengthen the supervision of information disclosure of listed companies.