Empirical Study On The Effects Of Listed Companies' Executive Shareholding Increase On Investment Behavior And Firm Performance

With the gradual improvement of the modern enterprise system and the continuous development and expansion of the company,the company owner's energy is limited so that it can not cope with the increasingly formal and professional management,the vast majority of owners choose to hire a dedicated management team to run the company's daily business management.The separation of ownership and management rights by the company has led to a proxy issue.In order to alleviate the agency costs associated with the separation of the two powers,the company usually established a model of executive holdings,making them part of the business.Through given stock shares to executives,making the interests of executives and shareholders of the interests of convergence.The higher the shareholding of executives,the higher the degree of convergence with shareholders,and the tendency of executives to increase investment spending,with the increase in investment spending,the company's performance may be improved.In other words,with the continuous holdings of executives,the company will expand the scale of investment or the construction of new projects,this time with the increase in investment spending,the company's future financial performance will gradually increase.At present,domestic scholars' studies on the behavior of executives holdings is usually about which after the reform of the main-board market.Compared to the main-board market,the performance of listed companies on the GEM is more difficult to reflect through the financial statements.Compared to the main-board market executives,GEM executives is more important to the company's further performance,this type of executive holdings may be more closely linked with corporate performance.By observing the sample data of the holdings of the GEM executives and finding the similarity between the samples,then summarizing them,this paper adds the intermediate variables: investment expenditure ratio and the SPO behavior between the executive holdings and the firm's performance as two variables.This paper analyzes the impact of executive holdings on investment behavior and corporate performance.This paper analyzes the relationship between executive holdings and investment behavior and corporate performance after defining the definition of executives,investment behavior and corporate performance.Based on thetheoretical analysis,the mathematical model is established,and the total assets are selected in the model.Such as: Interest rate,executive holdings,investment and expenditure ratio,asset-liability ratio,issuance and other indicators to consider.Based on the data of the company holding executives from January 1,2012 to December 31,2014,using SPSS and EXCEL software to analyze the data and analyze the behavior of the executives' Investment expenditure and net profit of the company's total assets(ROA).The conclusion of this paper is as follows:(1)The proportion of executives holdings of listed companies is proportional to the proportion of investment expenditure;(2)The proportion of investment expenses of listed companies is proportional to the performance of the company;(3)The proportion of executives holdings is proportional to the performance of the company;(4)the SPO behavior after the holdings of listed companies will increase the impact of the proportion of investment expenses on the performance of the company.