Research On The Performance Of Stock Incentives For Chinese Commercial State-owned Enterprises

Based on the data of commercial state-owned listed companies in China from2013 to 2018,this paper analyzes the relationship among executive equity incentive,enterprise performance and agency cost of commercial state-owned enterprises by using agency cost as adjustment variable.The results show that executive equity incentive has a positive impact on corporate performance,while agency cost has a negative impact on corporate performance.Further research shows that agency cost has a negative effect on equity incentive and enterprise performance.Most of the literature on the relationship between executive equity incentive and corporate performance in commercial state-owned enterprises does not further explore the moderating effect of agency cost on corporate performance.This paper will expand the scope of research on corporate performance of commercial state-owned enterprises,have some reference value for policy makers,managers and investors.Finally,it can provide useful reference for the executive equity incentive mechanism of Chinese commercial state-owned listed companies and urge enterprises to adopt compensation incentive mechanism suitable for their own objectives.This paper is divided into five chapters: the first chapter,introduction.With the continuous deepening and reform of the state-owned capital authorized management system,the equity incentive system of state-owned enterprises has been widely used and strongly supported.This paper puts forward some problems about the influence of the executive equity incentive system of commercial state-owned enterprises onenterprise performance,and constructs the structural framework of the article.At the same time,it finds out the innovation and deficiency of the article.The second chapter,related theory overview.First of all,the concept of commercial state-owned enterprises is separated from the classification criteria of the dichotomy of state-owned enterprises;the way of equity incentive system is explained in detail,including stock option,virtual stock,stock appreciation right,restricted stock,and the concept of agency cost and enterprise performance.Chapter three,the historical evolution and present situation of the equity incentive system of Chinese commercial state-owned enterprises.The historical evolution and present situation of equity incentive system of commercial state-owned enterprises in China are expounded respectively.Chapter four,empirical research.Carry on the research hypothesis and select the variable;use the software such as Stata15,SPSS11,Excel to carry on the empirical test to the correlation between the equity incentive system and the enterprise performance of the commercial state-owned enterprise,and add the agency cost as the adjustment variable,investigate the adjustment function of the agency cost,and finally carry on the robustness analysis to the research result.The fifth chapter summarizes the research results,draws conclusions and puts forward reasonable countermeasures and suggestions for the executive equity incentive system of commercial state-owned enterprises.Based on the present situation of equity incentive system of commercial state-owned enterprises and the empirical research results,this paper analyzes the aspects that need to be paid attention to in the economic environment of our country,and puts forward the corresponding countermeasures to perfect the equity incentive system of commercial state-owned enterprises combined with the adjustment mechanism of agency cost.