A Study On The Performance Mechanism Of Part-time Directors In A State-owned Enterprise

As the pillar of China's national economy,the governance level of stateowned enterprises is directly related to the success or failure of China's enterprise reform.The problems faced by the governance of large state-owned enterprises are more different from those of developed countries with market economy in the west,and need to be dealt with by more intelligent methods and means.At present,the capital is the key link of the structure in the parentsubsidiary corporation systems.It has different forms of the subordinate company based on the different capital structures,such as wholly-owned,holding and equity participation.In accordance with the relevant requirements of the Company Law,the Articles of Association and the corporate governance structure,the parent company and its subsidiaries also form corresponding property rights for the investment part of the parent company.Usually,the parent company assigns part-time directors,supervisors,and some even directly assigns senior managers to subsidiaries to achieve the purpose of controlling subsidiaries.Nevertheless,it does not achieve expectations.According to the relevant provisions of the new Company Law,According to the company law,it is of great significance to select a reasonable management mode of dispatched directors,to promote member enterprises to establish and in the corporate governance structure,and to continuously improve the effectiveness of corporate governance results and to promote the rapid,sustained and harmonious development of the member units of the company.At present,the research on corporate governance,especially the governance of state-owned enterprises,mostly discusses the relatively special principal-agent relationship and typical corporate governance issues from the relationship between enterprises and government,between enterprises and the SASAC.Those researches focus on the theory rather than the practice.The theme of this article is based on the shareholder status of state-owned enterprises,how to effectively manage the part-time directors who are assigned to wholly-owned,holding and shareholding companies,and how to rationalize and improve the performance mechanism of the part-time directors.On the basis of combing the relevant theoretical research results and taking A company as an example,this article analyses the current situation of its expatriate part-time directors' management,and based on the role conflict theory,analyzes the main problems and their causes in the performance of expatriate part-time directors,and then puts forward some suggestions on improving the performance mechanism of expatriate part-time directors in state-owned enterprises.The main conclusions of this article are as follows:1.Taking the governance of state-owned enterprises as the background,this article combs the relevant research results from the aspects of board governance,parent-subsidiary companies,directors' duty of loyalty and diligence,and the performance of expatriate directors,and on this basis,forms the research ideas of this article.2.Taking a large state-owned enterprise(A company)in Zhejiang Province as the research object,this article conducts an in-depth interview with the parttime directors of the enterprise.It is found that there are some problems in the performance of part-time directors,such as the imperfect governance mechanism of parent and subsidiary companies,the non-standard management of authorization,the unreasonable evaluation and incentive of the expatriate directors,and the inadequate operation of the corporate governance structure of subsidiary companies.3.Based on the in-depth analysis of role conflict theory,this article analyses the reasons why expatriate directors fail to perform their duties in terms of job orientation,job roles,time and energy,and tries to design a standardized expatriate performance mechanism for state-owned enterprises,including standardizing the rules for the appointment of expatriate part-time directors,the design of board members of subsidiary companies,the management system for evaluation of expatriate part-time directors and the establishment of incentive and restraint mechanism for expatriate part-time directors.We are expecting to contribute to the improvement of corporate governance efficiency in related fields.