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Quantitative Analysis Of Shadow Banking,Macro-prudential Supervision And Economic Fluctuations

Posted on:2021-05-03Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:Y F XieFull Text:PDF
GTID:2439330647950394Subject:Quantitative Economics
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
Since the 21 st century,with the development of financial liberalization and financial innovation,the size of shadow banking has expanded rapidly.The rapid development of shadow banking,while improving capital efficiency,has also accumulated huge systemic risks in the financial system.It was once considered to be an important reason for the outbreak of the financial crisis in 2008.After the outbreak of the financial crisis,countries around the world began to reform from micro-prudential to macro-prudential supervision.As China's economy enters a new normal,preventing and mitigating systemic financial risks has become a staged goal of China's financial supervision.Macro-prudential supervision policies for shadow banks are gradually being strengthened.How to balance the relationship between "controlling risks" and "steady growth" has also become a hot issue.This paper mainly studies the characteristics of the economic system including shadow banking and the supervision of shadow banking,and uses quantitative analysis to explore the reasonable and prudent ways of financial supervision policies.Through the comparative analysis of the development process of shadow banking and financial supervision between China and the United States,the three characteristics of China's shadow banking system are dominated by traditional banks,branch supervision and credit intermediation.Based on this,this paper builds a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with two types of banking departments,shadow banking and traditional banking,and combines macro and micro foundations to study shadow banking supervision.The three-level simulation of the regulatory policy represented by the capital adequacy ratio is carried out: only the supervision of traditional bank loan business,the simultaneous supervision of traditional bank loan business and wealth management product business,and the overall supervision of traditional bank and shadow bank.Finally,the basic model is further expanded,and the changes of the economic system under the situation of breaking rigid payment are simulated and analyzed.Through research,it is found that the main source of economic fluctuations lies in the supervision costs,technical shocks,and regulatory shocks of traditional banks.The existence of shadow banking has weakened the effectiveness of financial regulatory policies and significantly amplified economic volatility during the process of financial regulation;with the expansion of regulatory aperture,the effectiveness of regulatory policies has increased significantly,although the short-term significantly increased economic downward pressure However,in the long run,this pressure will gradually be eliminated,and overall it will help to effectively reduce financial risks.In addition,we find that breaking rigid payment helps financial product pricing mechanism to be more reasonable.At this time,the effectiveness of regulatory policies has been significantly strengthened.In the process of breaking rigid payment,it is recommended to choose more regulatory targets.
Keywords/Search Tags:Macro-prudential supervision, Shadow banking, DSGE model, Supervision shock
PDF Full Text Request
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